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Introduction
Shareholders of public companies rely on the board of directors to perform a variety of tasks
on their behalf: set strategy, approve major transactions, monitor the senior management,
and appoint and replace the CEO. Which type of directors can be expected to serve the best
interests of shareholders? Directors with the relevant business expertise are often considered
to be natural candidates. Presumably, a mix of industry knowledge, experience, formal edu-
cation in related disciplines, and social ties, is a recipe for a successful corporate policy. The
empirical literature, however, does not fully support this premise. In some cases, it provides
the opposite evidence. For example, Guner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008) nd that rms with
investment bankers on their boards undertake worse acquisitions.1 This raises the question
whether shareholders should demand high level of expertise from their board members, and if
so, under what conditions. More broadly, understanding the optimal structure of the board has
become particularity important in light of recent trends of corporate governance which have
given shareholders more power and inuence on the composition of corporate boards.2
This paper studies three topics that are related to the expertise of directors: the optimal
level of expertise on the board, the interaction between expertise and the a¢ liation of directors,
and the e¤ect of directorsreputation concerns for being experts on the value of the rm. By
focusing on the expertise of directors this paper o¤ers a new perspective on the optimal structure
of corporate boards.
In order to study this topic I develop a model of boards expertise. In the model, the board
1In addition, Defond, Hann, and Hu (2005) document a positive stock market reaction to the appointment
of directors with accounting knowledge to the audit committee, but not to the appointment of other nancial
experts. Fich (2005) nds that the cumulative abnormal return in response to the addition of a director who
is CEO of another rm is signicantly greater the higher the industry-adjusted ROA of his rm. However, the
e¤ect is insignicant and sometimes even negative, if the new director holds a MBA or is an academic.
2For example, the increased role played by proxy advisory rms in directors elections (Alexander et al.
(2008)), the debate on whether shareholders should be granted with an easier proxy access (for more details
see, for example, Fisch (2011)), the shift from plurality to majority voting system in directors elections (Kahan
and Rock (2010)), and the Proxy Disclosure Enhancements regulation which was adopted by the SEC in 2009
and requires companies to provide new disclosure about the background and qualications of directors and
nominees.
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decides whether to invest in a project based on the expertise of its directors and the recommen-
dation given by the manager of the company. The expertise of the board is measured by the
quality of its private information about the protability of the rms investment opportunity.
The manager, by the nature of his job, can produce valuable and private information which
is unavailable to the board. The production and communication of this information do not
impose direct costs on the manager. However, because of conicting preferences, the manager
may still choose not to produce or share information. Board members (at least partly) observe
the managers e¤ort to produce information, but unless the manager discloses his nding, they
cannot observe the content of this information. Without this information, directors must rely
on their own judgment when making decisions, circumstances in which their expertise is rela-
tively more important. Thus, the model reects the view that the expertise of directors matters
the most when the manager does not cooperate with the board.
All else equal, shareholders are better o¤ with a higher level of boards expertise. However,
the rst result of the paper demonstrates that when the incentives of the manager to produce
and share information with the board are considered, the expertise of a value-maximizing board
can harm shareholder value.
In order to understand this result, note that expertise of the board has two countervailing
e¤ects. The obvious e¤ect of expertise is positive, it reduces the likelihood the board chooses
a sub-optimal investment policy. The negative e¤ect is more subtle. I show that even though
the production of information is costless, the boards expertise can discourage the managers
incentives to produce and share information. Basically, since managerial e¤ort is observable
by the board, learning increases the likelihood the board ignores the recommendation of the
manager when the latter conceals information. Expertise interacts with this prejudice e¤ect and
may increase it. In order to minimize this e¤ect, the manager invests less e¤ort in learning. To
the extent that the managers information is relatively more important than the expertise of the
board, the negative e¤ect dominates and a higher level of boards expertise is associated with
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a lower shareholder value. This result challenges the view that more expertise on corporate
boards necessarily improves rms policy, and it is consistent with the ambiguous empirical
evidence on the value of directorsexpertise.
The second result of this paper provides conditions under which the optimal structure
of the board consists of directors whose objective is misaligned with value-maximization. It
demonstrates that as long as the manager has su¢ cient access to information, it is never optimal
to structure a board whose members are a¢ liated with the manager. Instead, if directors have
high expertise, the optimal a¢ liation of the board is against the agenda of the manager. Thus,
by contrast to the existing literature on corporate boards, this result implies that shareholders
can benet from supporting nominees for the board who are inherently biased against the
incumbent management and would frequently challenge its view.3
Intuitively, when the bias of the board is directed against the manager, the board would
follow the recommendation of the manager only if the latter provides solid evidence to backup
his recommendation. Therefore, the manager has more incentives to produce and share infor-
mation with a biased board. When choosing the structure of the board, shareholders trade
o¤ between informed and distorted board decision making. It is optimal to appoint directors
who are biased against the manager when the latter has su¢ cient access to information but his
incentives to produce and share it with the board are otherwise weak.
The third result of the paper demonstrates that the desire of directors to demonstrate exper-
tise can shift power from the board to the manager and result with a lower shareholder value.4
In particular, concerns for reputation distort the boards behavior from maximizing the value
of shareholders and the board under-reacts to public information. This distortion is exploited
3For example, Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Almazan and Suarez (2003) argue that boards which are
a¢ liated with the incumbent management are optimal. One exception is Baranchuk and Dybvig (2009) who
use a cooperative solution concept to study directorscollective decision making. They show that sometimes it
is better to add a new informed director to the board who has conicted preferences with insiders than adding
an uninformed and independent director.
4While the rst result of the paper shows that expertise can adversely a¤ect the value of the rm, directors
still have incentives to demonstrate expertise when the demand for expertise varies across rms and directors
can simultaneously serve on more than one board.
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by the manager, and hence, the direction and the magnitude of the boards bias relative to the
managers agenda are determined in equilibrium. In this sense, the friendlinessof the board
is endogenous since it depends on the decision of the manager to produce and share information
with the board and the perception of the boards quality by its shareholders. Interestingly, the
e¤ect of directorsreputation concerns on managerial cooperation and the value of shareholders
is amplied by the transparency of the communication within the boardroom. This is because
transparency enables shareholders to tell apart between decisions the board makes based on its
expertise and decisions which are taken based on the managers recommendation.
Overall, the composition of the results in this paper sheds light on new considerations that
ought to be taken into account by shareholders and policy makers when designing the structure
of corporate boards. The analysis suggests that demanding a minimum level of expertise from
independent directors (to be eligible to serve on the board of a public company) can harm
shareholders even when the conict of interests with their manager is signicant. In those
circumstances, it may be useful to encourage the appointment of directors whose agenda is
not necessarily consistent with maximizing shareholdersvalue, but it contrasts the incumbent
management. Labor unions and hedge funds are examples for potential dissenting voices on
corporate boards. Moreover, putting directors under pressure, a reection of recent trends in
the corporate governance of public U.S. companies, can enhance the incentives of directors to
manage their reputation and demonstrate expertise. Consequently, instead of more discipline,
managers of public companies might gain more power. This suggests that the amount of control
that shareholders have on the identity of elected directors should be treated with caution.
Finally, promoting a policy which would require more transparency of boardroom minutes can
in fact reduce the amount of information that is available to shareholders and the board itself,
even if information is not proprietary. Thus, transparency can adversely a¤ect the value of the
rm.
The paper proceeds as follows. The remainder of this section discusses the relationship
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to the existing literature. Section I presents the baseline model in which the board is value-
maximizing and has no reputation concerns. Section II analyzes optimal board a¢ liation and
its interaction with directorsexpertise. Section III introduces boards concerns for reputation
and studies their e¤ect on the interaction in the boardroom and shareholder value. Section IV
provides concluding remarks and discusses the policy implications and the empirical predictions
of the analysis in this paper. All omitted proofs and supplemental results are collected in the
Appendix.
Relation to the Literature
The present paper is related to the agency literature on informed principal. A key observation
of this literature is that information ows alleviate an adverse selection problem (it is easier
to detect agents type) but also create a moral hazard problem (the agent exerts less costly
e¤ort).5 In the context of corporate boards, Hermalin andWeisbach (2012) argue that managers
will need to be compensated for the harm caused them by the expert board, and that the
increase in compensation is the cost of having an expert board. Levit (2011) demonstrates
that recommendations given to target shareholders by their informed board can deter value-
increasing bidders. Thus, in the context of takeovers, uninformed target boards may create
more value to their shareholders than an informed board. Di¤erent from these studies, the task
of the agent (the companys manager) in the present model is to collect information (at no
direct cost) and then communicate it to the partly informed principal (the board). Therefore,
the channel through which expertise can be harmful is fundamentally di¤erent in the present
paper.
The current study is also related to Che and Kartik (2009) and Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011). Che and Kartik (2009) study a model in which the agent produces information (at
5For example, see Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997), Cremer (1995), Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole
(1999), Holmstrom (1999), Rajan (1992), and Von Thadden (1995). Di¤erent from these studies, Prat (2005)
shows that the transparency of actions taken by an agent with reputation concerns for his expertise can create
incentives for the agent to disregard useful private information.
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a cost) and then voluntarily disclose it to an uninformed decision maker. Their key result
shows that di¤erence of opinions (agreeing to disagree) can help to alleviate the hold-up
problem of a costly information acquisition. By contrast, the present study abstracts from
these hold-up motives and focuses on the interaction between the precision of the decision
makers private information and the incentives of the agent to collect and disclose additional
information. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) show that the agent can benet from disclosure of
information if the principal does not take the agents preferred action by default. Key to their
results is the agents inability to conceal information once the signal realization is known. The
present paper extends their framework by showing that the quality of the principals private
information can deprive the agents incentives to collect information even when the latter can
conceal it from the principal.6
Adams and Ferreira (2007) study the dual role of the board as advisor and monitor of
management. They argue that in order to obtain better information from managers, the board
may want to commit not to use this information in evaluating managerial performance. In this
sense, they argue, friendly boards are optimal. Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2011) and Harris and
Raviv (2005, 2008, 2010) employ two-sided private information in the Crawford and Sobel (1982)
model of strategic information transmission, and analyze optimal delegation between the board
(or shareholders) and the manager. Unlike the present paper, in these studies information is
non-veriable, and hence, misalignment of preferences always reduces the amount of information
that is disclosed in equilibrium. Moreover, in the above studies the boards information is
incremental to the managerinformation, while in the present paper the boards expertise is an
imperfect substitute.
In the context of reputation, Hirshleifer and Thakor (1998) show that if the board is su¢ -
ciently concerned about its own job security, the threat of a hostile takeover can pressure the
6In this respect, the present model builds on Dyes (1990) model of voluntary disclosure which proposes
that uncertainty of whether the sender is informed allows senders with bad news to claim they have no new
information, rather than disclose it. The present paper endogenizes the information endowment of the sender.
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board to re the manager even when it is suboptimal. Ruiz-Verdu and Singh (2011) show that
in order to be perceived as independent, boards lower managerspay, but may also pay man-
agers in hidden and ine¢ cient ways. Di¤erent from these studies, the present paper highlights
that the boards concerns for reputation can be exploited by the opportunistic manager and
thereby lead to ine¢ cient decisions. Song and Thakor (2006) study a model of information
transmission in which the tension between the manager and the board is the outcome of the
their conicting career concerns. Unlike the present paper, in their model the manager cannot
collect information and the board can add value since it obtains information that is unavailable
to the manager.
I A Model of Boards Expertise
A Setup
Consider a rm whose value to shareholders depends on its business strategy and the fundamen-
tals. Let a 2 f0; 1g be the strategy, ! 2 f0; 1g the true state of the world, and p  Pr [! = 1] 2
(0; 1) the common prior on !. The value of the rm is given by v (a; !) = 1fa=!g. Thus, when
! = 1 the optimal strategy is a = 1 and when ! = 0 the optimal strategy is a = 0. For example,
the relative value of growing the rm through acquisitions (rather than expanding it internally)
is a function of its organizational culture and the supply of potential targets. While strategy a
can relate to the rms investment policy, capital structure, or corporate governance, in what
follows I refer to decision a as investment and say that the project is approved when a = 1 and
the project is rejected otherwise.
The rm is run by a manager whose preferences are given by uM (a; !) = 1fa=1g. That is,
the manager derives direct utility from investing in the project regardless of how much value it
generates to shareholders. For example, if a = 1 represents growth through acquisitions then an
empire-building manager benets from acquiring other rms even if value is destroyed. Since
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the manager is self-interested, the decision making authority over a is allocated to the board
of directors.7 The board is monolithic and the manager does not have a seat on the board.
The boards objective is to maximize value for shareholders and its preferences are given by
uB (a; !) = v (a; !). All preferences are common knowledge.
Shareholders are uninformed about the fundamentals of the rm !, but their board has
expertise which reects directors experience (e.g., former executives and directors in other
companies) and profession (e.g., lawyers, accountants, bankers, academics, and former politi-
cians). High expertise is associated with a higher likelihood the board obtains private infor-
mation about !. Specically, with probability  2 [0; 1] the board observes an informative
signal s on ! and with probability 1    the board remains uninformed. The likelihood the
board is informed is independent of !, and whether the board is informed and the content of
signal s are the boards private information. The board does not micro-manage the rm, and
hence, has a limited access to information. I therefore assume that the boards private signal
is imperfect. Specically, let f! and F! be the density and the cumulative functions, respec-
tively, for the probability of receiving signal s 2 [s; s] if the true state of the world is !. The
functions f! () are continuous and the likelihood function l (s)  f1(s)f0(s) is strictly increasing.
Moreover, lims!s l (s) = 1 and lims!s l (s) = 0. Thus, without additional information, the
boards decision whether to approve the project depends on its private information.8
Unlike the board, the manager has free access to information and he can learn about ! at
no personal cost.9 For example, the manager can invest in research and development, question
his subordinates, solicit consultantsopinions, or engage in competitive intelligence, in order to
testand explore the projects protability. These investments in information generate signals
about the quality of the project. The precision and veriability of these signals are increasing
7While studying optimal delegation is not the focus of the present paper, it can be shown that it is never
optimal (from shareholderspoint of view) to delegate the decision making to the manager.
8The assumption on the limit properties of l () is not necessary for the main results but it simplies the
exposition. The crucial assumption is the existence of s^ 2 (s; s) such that l (s^) = 1.
9The main results continue to hold even if learning is costly to the manager. However, by abstracting from
hold-up problems a la Cremer (1995), the analysis reveals new channel through which expertise can be harmful.
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in e 2 [0; e], the resources expended on learning. Parameter e 2 (0; 1] reects the access the
manager has to information. By learning, the manager obtains a non-veriable signal e on !
where ge (j!) is its conditional density function. In addition, with probability e the manager
obtains a veriable signal  e on ! and with probability 1   e the manager does not obtain a
veriable signal. Signal  e is a su¢ cient statistic for ! with respect to the boards signal s.
That is, Pr [! = 1j e =  ; s] = Pr [! = 1j e =  ] for all  and s. This reects the underlining
assumption that the manager can obtain hardinformation which is relatively more important
than the boards expertise.10 For simplicity, I assume  e  !. Let Ie be the information set of
the manager, then Ie = fe; !g with probability e and Ie = feg otherwise.11 The content of
Ie is the managers private information.
The manager cannot dictate the strategy of the rm, but he can use his informational
advantage in order to inuence the boards decision. I assume the manager sends the board a
message m = (m1;m2) before the board decides on a. The content of message m1 is veriable.
Veriable information cannot be manipulated and any attempt to present a falsied presentation
fails. Thus, if the manager observes !, he can either set m1 = ! or conceal this information
by sending the board message m1 = . If the manager does not observe !, his only option is
sending m1 = . By contrast, the content of message m2 is non-veriable. Hence, m2 can be
manipulated and take any value in [0; 1] regardless of Ie.12 Let e (m1;m2jIe) be the probability
the manager sends veriable message m1 and non-veriable message m2 conditional on learning
intensity e and the managers private information Ie. Note that by assumption, if ! 62 Ie then
e (1;m2jIe) = e (0;m2jIe) = 0 and if ! 2 Ie then e (1  !;m2jIe) = 0. I assume the message
10Note that if e < 1 the boards expertise complements the managers access to information. The results of
the paper continue to hold even if the board has information which is never available to the manager, as long
as the complementary of this information is not signicant.
11Formally, Ie = fe; eg where e 2 f0; 1; g, e = ! with probability e, and e =  otherwise. The manager
cannot provehe does not have veriable information on !. Thus, while e = ! is veriable, e =  is not.
12To x ideas, if the agenda is the acquisition of a competitor, the manager can provide the board with hard
information such as valuation models about expected synergies, nancing commitments, lawyersopinion about
the regulatory risk, and so on. At the same time, the manager can provide soft information about the
friendliness of the targets management to the deal and the moral of employees.
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m = (m1;m2) has no direct e¤ect on the managers utility. Thus, there are no costs or benets
from disclosure or manipulation per-se.
The board relies on several sources of information when making decisions: public infor-
mation, its own expertise, and the managers report m. I denote by ae;m (s) the probability
the board decides on a = 1 given this information.13 An important assumption of the model
is that the managers learning intensity e is observable by the board but cannot be explicitly
contracted. In the context of board-manager interaction this assumption seems reasonable. For
example, learning about the benet from an acquisition requires the manager to spend time
meeting with the targets directors and senior management, consulting investment bankers and
lawyers, and questioning the companys employees, costumers, and suppliers, about the feasi-
bility of a successful integration. These meetings (their existence but not their content) are
likely to be at least partly observed and noticed within the rm and by the board. At the
same time, projects (or acquisitions) are di¤erent along many dimensions. E¤ective learning
requires the manager to approach a di¤erent set of people, ask a di¤erent set of questions, and
integrate the answers using di¤erent methodologies. All of which are hard to specify ex-ante
when writing a contract.14
Time 0:
The manager decides on
his learning intensity e
Time 1:
The manager obtains signals
on ω and sends the board
message m
Time 2:
Based on message m, signal
s, and its expertise, the board
decides on a, whether to
accept the project
Time 3:
State ω and the value of the
firm v(a,ω) are realized.
Figure 1 - Timeline
13Notation is simplied by assuming that the uninformed board receives signal s^ with probability one.
14I follow the common approach of incomplete contracting by Grossman and Hart (1986) by assuming the
board cannot use monetary transfers that are perfectly contingent on the information or e¤ort provided by the
manager. In this respect, the main results of this paper only require that the board observes e with a non-zero
probability and that high levels of e¤ort cannot be contracted. Since there are no direct costs for e¤ort, if e is
completely unobserved by the board then in any equilibrium the manager chooses e = e.
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Overall, the sequence of events unfolds as follows. At the outset the manager decides on
his learning intensity e. The manager cannot commit to any disclosure strategy. Thus, given
his decision e and his private information Ie, the manager sends the board a private message
m = (m1;m2). Based on all sources of information, the board decides on the probability ae;m (s)
that the project is approved. Last, the state of the world ! and the outcome of the project are
realized.
Before we turn into the analysis it is important to note that the board cannot commit
to decision rules which are ex-post ine¢ cient conditional on the information it obtains. For
example, a commitment to approving the project if and only if the manager discloses ! = 1
is ruled out. If allowed, this commitment can enhance the incentives of the manager to collect
and share information. Yet, even this strong commitment will not achieve the rst best as long
as e < 1. In this respect, lack of expertise, a¢ liation, and reputation concerns, are mechanisms
that under certain conditions implement a similar commitment power.
B Analysis
The model is solved backward. For each level of learning intensity e there exists an induced
game with incomplete and asymmetric information which is denoted by G (e). I start by solving
for the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of G (e).
Consider the boards decision whether to approve the project. The board is maximizing the
value of shareholders. Thus, the board approves the project if and only if given its information
the probability that ! = 1 is greater than 1
2
. This decision rule is ex-post e¢ cient from share-
holderspoint of view. Recall the boards information is nested into the managers information.
Thus, if the manager discloses veriable information about ! (and hencem1 2 f0; 1g), the board
always nds it optimal to defer to the managers view and choose a = m1. If the manager does
not disclose veriable information about ! then the board forms its beliefs about ! given its
private signal s, the managers non-veriable message m2, the knowledge of e, and the expec-
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tations that the manager would follow disclosure strategy e. Let q  Pr [! = 1je;m1 = ;m2]
be the posterior probability that ! = 1 conditional on non-disclosure of veriable information
by the manager, but unconditional on signal s. Applying Bayesrules, for any s 2 [s; s] the
boards posterior beliefs are given by l(s)
l(s)+(1 q)=q . The board approves the project if and only if
s  s (q) where s (q)  l 1 ((1  q) =q). The pair (s; q) is a su¢ cient statistic for the informa-
tion that is available to the board conditional on non-disclosure of veriable information by the
manager. The following lemma summarizes the above discussion and characterizes equilibria
of the sub-game that is induced by the managers learning intensity e.
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium of the induced game G (e):
(i) The manager discloses veriable information if ! = 1 and withholds it if ! = 0.
(ii) Non-veriable information is revealed only if the manager discloses veriable information.
(iii) If m1 6=  then ae;m (s) = m1 and otherwise ae;m (s) = 1fss(q(e))g where q (e)  p ep1 ep .15
Lemma 1 has several implications for the managers disclosure policy. First, in any equi-
librium the manager has correct expectations regrading the boards reaction to his disclosure
decision. In particular, the manager realizes that if he discloses veriable information about !
the board will choose a = ! with probability one. Thus, if the manager obtains hard evidence
on !, he always has strict incentives to disclose ! = 1 and weak incentives to conceal ! = 0.
Second, Lemma 1 implies that there is no equilibrium in which the manager is able to
inuence the boards decision by communicating non-veriable information about !. To see
why, recall the managers objective is to maximize the probability the project is approved
by the board. Thus, if the manager discloses veriable information about !, any additional
information is redundant and cannot change the boards decision. If instead the manager
15Unless m1 =  and s = s (q), the boards optimal decision is unique. It is implicitly assumed that the
board plays pure strategies.
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does not disclose veriable information about !, the manager has strict incentives to send the
non-veriable message that leads to the highest probability of approval. This implies that in
equilibrium any non-veriable message must lead to the same action and information about e
cannot be revealed.16
Third, if the manager does not disclose veriable information, part (ii) of Lemma 1 suggests
that the boards decision depends solely on its expertise and its inference from the managers
decision not to disclose information. To the extent that e < 1, the manager does not disclose
veriable information about ! either because he does not obtain such information or because
he strategically conceals this information. The board accounts for both possibilities and adjusts
its beliefs accordingly. In particular, since the manager is biased toward the approval of the
project, non-disclosure always conveys information about its non-protability and q (e)  p.
Moreover, q (e) is decreasing in e which implies that the board put relatively more weight on
the event that the manager strategically conceals information about ! = 0 the higher is the
managerial learning intensity.
Given the characterization of the equilibrium of the induced game G (e), I turn into studying
the managers learning intensity decision. Since information about e cannot be credibly com-
municated, hereafter I refer to learning only with respect to veriable information about !. Let
 (q; x) be the ex-ante probability the informed board approves the project if an outsider be-
lieves that Pr [! = 1] = x and prior to observing signal s the board believes that Pr [! = 1] = q.
The function  (q; x) is given by,
 (q; x) = 1  xF1 (s (q))  (1  x)F0 (s (q)) (1)
Among other properties, Lemma A.1 in the Appendix proves that  (q; x) strictly increases in
q and x. Since the ex-ante utility of the manager is the unconditional probability the board
16As long the bias of the manager is signicant, non-veriable information cannot be revealed in equilibrium
when m1 = . If  is not a su¢ cient statistic for ! with respect to  then non-veriable information cannot be
revealed even if m1 6= .
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approves the project, it can be written as follows,
E [uM (e)] = ep+ e (1  p)
h
 (q (e) ; 0) + (1  )  1fq(e) 12g
i
(2)
+ (1  e)
h
 (q (e) ; p) + (1  )  1fq(e) 12g
i
There are three terms in (2) to consider. The rst term corresponds to events in which the
manager successfully collects information about ! and nds out that ! = 1. Under those
circumstances the manager can guarantee the approval of the project by sharing this veriable
information with the board. The second and the third terms correspond to the events in which
the manager does not disclose information. In the second term the manager learns that ! = 0
and strategically withholds this information from the board. Conditional on this event the
manager believes that the informed board will approve the project with probability  (q (e) ; 0)
while the uninformed board will approve the project with probability one if q (e)  1
2
and
reject it otherwise. In the third term the manager fails to collect hard evidence on ! and since
non-veriable information cannot be credibly communicated, no information is disclosed.
Lemma 2 Given learning intensity e, the managers expected utility increases in  if and only
if q (e) < 1
2
.
Lemma 2 reveals that despite his conict of interests with the board (and shareholders), the
manager benets from high level of boards expertise exactly when this conict of interests is
signicant, that is, when ex-ante the investment is non-protable. Intuitively, when q (e) < 1
2
the board approves the project conditional on non-disclosure only if it receives su¢ ciently high
signal on the protability of investment. An expert board is more likely to receive a high
signal than an informed board. Thus, the manager benets from the boards expertise. When
q (e) > 1
2
this dynamic is reversed and the board approves the project conditional on non-
disclosure unless it receives su¢ ciently low signal on !. Thus, the boards expertise harms the
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manager.
The next proposition veries that an equilibrium of the entire game exists and characterizes
the managers learning intensity in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 An equilibrium always exists. Let e be the learning intensity in equilibrium
and qmin  arg minq2[q(e);p]
n
1 (q;q)
1 q
o
, then:
(i) If p < 1
2
then e decreases in , e ( = 0) = e, and e ( = 1) < e, qmin > q (e).
(ii) If p  1
2
there exist e+ < e and + (p; e) > 0 (where + < 1, qmin < 12) such that:
 If   + then e = e+.
 If  > + then e > e+ and e decreases in .
Proposition 1 reveals that the manager may choose to remain uninformed (e < e) even
though learning does not impose direct costs on the manager. The reason is that being informed
imposes indirect costs on the manager in the following sense. According to Lemma 1, the
manager discloses information about ! if and only if ! = 1. Thus, the board infers from non-
disclosure that either the manager failed to collect information about ! or that the manager
strategically conceals information about ! = 0. The relative likelihood of the latter event
increases with the amount of resources the manager spends on collecting information. Since
the board observes the managers learning intensity, it will adjust downward its posterior beliefs
about ! = 1. This prejudice e¤ect of learning reduces the likelihood the board approves the
project, and hence, imposes an indirect cost on the manager. In other words, the indirect cost
of learning is giving up the option to conceal information about ! = 0. The optimal learning
intensity of the manager trades o¤ this indirect cost with the possibility of learning that ! = 1
and using this information to persuade the board to approve the project.
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In order to gain more intuition, suppose p < 1
2
and note that (2) can be rewritten as
E [uM (q)] = 1  (1  p)

1   (q; q)
1  q

(3)
The managers expected utility is uniquely determined by q, the posterior beliefs that ! = 1
conditional on non-disclosure. His decision on the learning intensity is equivalent to choosing
q 2 [q (e) ; p]. The term  (q; q) is the ex-ante probability (prior to observing the signal about
!) the manager ascribes to the event that the board approves the project conditional on non-
disclosure. It follows from (3) that if e = 1 then the manager chooses q > 0 (or equivalently
e < 1) if and only if there exists q 2 [0; p] such that  (q; q) > q. Intuitively,  (q; q)
is the alternative and indirect cost of collecting an extra unit of information, and q is the
likelihood that ! = 1 and hence the benet from learning. As long as  (q; q) is greater than
q, the manager gains from not collecting all the available information. The requirement that
qmin > q (e) generalizes the condition above for any e.
Proposition 1 also highlights that the equilibrium level of the managers learning intensity
almost everywhere decreases with the boards expertise, which is captured by . When p < 1
2
and in the absence of disclosure, the board rejects the project unless its private information is
su¢ ciently positive. Thus, all else equal, the likelihood the board approves the project increases
with its expertise . This implies that in this region the indirect cost of learning increases with
the boards expertise, but the benet is xed. Therefore, the manager has fewer incentives to
learn about !. When p  1
2
the dynamic is partly reversed. The board approves the project
unless its private information is su¢ ciently negative. In this case, the indirect cost of learning
decreases with the boards expertise. Nevertheless, when e is su¢ ciently high and q (e) < 1
2
,
similar to description above for the case p < 1
2
, the indirect cost of learning will start to increase
with the boards expertise. As Figure 2 illustrates, e can be non-monotonic in  when p  1
2
.
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Figure 2 - Managerial learning intensity in equilibrium
The analysis demonstrates that the equilibrium level of learning intensity increases with p
almost everywhere. This is intuitive since higher p implies that for a given level of learning
intensity the likelihood the manager learns that ! = 1 is higher. In other words, the net return
from collecting information increases with p. Nevertheless, the equilibrium level of e can fall
discretely at p = 1
2
. Indeed, when  is small and p < 1
2
the board is likely to reject the project
in the absence of additional information. Thus, the manager has strong incentives to collect
and share information. However, when  is small and p = 1
2
the board is likely to approve the
project even without receiving additional information. Therefore, the incentives of the manager
to collect information about ! are weaker.
While the managers learning intensity in equilibrium does not necessarily increase with p,
the probability the board approves the project in equilibrium does. Recall that the probability
the board approves the project is exactly the managers expected utility. As p increases, it
is easier for the manager to persuade the board to approve the project even if the learning
intensity is lower. Corollary 1 concludes this observation and characterizes the e¤ect of the
boards expertise on the likelihood that the project is undertaken in equilibrium.
Corollary 1 The probability the project is approved in equilibrium strictly increases in p, and
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it strictly increases in  unless p  1
2
and  < +.
Interestingly, it follows from Corollary 1 that a higher boards expertise does not neces-
sarily reduces the likelihood that the project is approved. One might expect that an expert
board would be able to counteract the managers bias toward the projects approval. However,
Corollary 1 suggests that the board fails to do so exactly when a priori shareholders and the
manager disagree on the benet from the project, that is, when p < 1
2
. This, however, does
not necessarily imply a greater ine¢ ciency. An informed board might act based on its private
information which may contrast the available public evidence. Nevertheless, I demonstrate
below that higher expertise can in fact harm shareholders even though the boards objective is
to maximize their value.
Shareholder Value
Unlike the manager, shareholders derive value from the investment in the project if and only if
! = 1. Thus, their expected welfare is exactly the probability that a = !. Explicitly,
V (e; ) = pe+ p (1  e)
h
 (q (e) ; 1) + (1  )  1fq(e) 12g
i
(4)
+ (1  p)
h
1   (q (e) ; 0)  (1  )  1fq(e) 12g
i
The rst and second terms in (4) correspond to scenarios in which the board chooses a = 1
conditional on ! = 1. This would be the case if either the board discloses information that
! = 1 or if conditional on non-disclosure the board nds it optimal to approve the project. The
third term corresponds to scenarios in which the board chooses a = 0 conditional on ! = 0.
Since the manager never discloses information about ! = 0, the project is rejected only if
information is not disclosed and the board nds it optimal to reject the project.
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Lemma 3 Shareholdersvalue V (e; ) strictly increases in e and .
It follows that shareholdersvalue increases with the amount of information that either their
manager or their board obtains. This is intuitive since in both cases the probability that the
correctaction is taken is higher. Indeed, since the managers disclosure policy is strategic,
whether or not the manager discloses information, all else equal, more information is revealed
if the manager spends more resources on learning. Therefore, the value-maximizing board is
more likely to make the right decision. Similarly, all else equal, a better informed board is more
likely to take the right decision ex-post, and shareholders are better o¤.
The next proposition demonstrates that despite the positive e¤ect of  on V (e; ), and
because the managers optimal learning intensity can decrease with , the boards expertise
might actually harm shareholdersvalue.
Proposition 2 Let  be the (highest) level of boards expertise that maximizes the value of
shareholders in equilibrium.
(i) If p < 1
2
there exists e < 1 such that  < 1 for all e 2 [e; 1] if and only if there exists
q 2 (0; p] such that  (q; q) > q.
(ii) If p  1
2
then 0 < +  .
Proposition 2 shows that when the manager has su¢ cient access to information (e is high),
the expertise of directors can be harmful, especially when the conict between shareholders
and the manager is a priori signicant. To see the intuition, recall the manager trades o¤ two
forces. On the one hand, the manager benets from collecting information since this way he can
persuade the board, regardless of its type, to approve the project if the evidence is supportive.
On the other hand, there is a risk that the evidence is not favorable. In this case, despite the
managers attempt to conceal this information, the board would make the right inference and
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some of this information, but not all of it, is revealed. This increases the likelihood the board
would reject the project and hence discourages the managers incentives to collect information.
As I explain below, the boards expertise changes this tradeo¤ in a non-trivial way.
Suppose ex-ante shareholders and the manager disagree on the benet from taking the
project, that is, p < 1
2
. If  (q; q)  q for all q 2 [0; p] then the board on average over-rejects
the project and the direct benet from learning always exceeds its alternative cost. Therefore,
regardless of the boards expertise, the manager spends as many resources as possible on learning
and e = e. Since the managers learning intensity is xed at its highest level, it follows from
Lemma 3 that shareholdersvalue increases with the expertise of their board. However, if there
exists q 2 (0; p] such that  (q; q) > q then the expert board sometimes over-approves the
project. Therefore, the alternative cost of learning increases with the boardexpertise and the
manager has fewer incentives to collect information. That is, the presence of expertise on the
board discourages managerial learning and cooperation. If the manager has su¢ cient access
to information (e 2 [e; 1]), the loss of this information is relatively more important than the
expertise of the board, and shareholder value would decrease with the boards expertise. In
the Appendix I show that when e = 1 then a completely uninformed board can be optimal
( = 0).
Alternatively, suppose shareholders and the manager a priori agree on the benet from
the project, that is, p  1
2
. With low expertise ( < +) and in the absence of additional
information it is unlikely the board would reject the project. Hence, the manager has very little
incentives to collect information and thereby taking the risk he would nd evidence against the
project, evidence that he would have to conceal. With high expertise, however, it is no longer
guaranteed that the board would approve the project in the absence of hard evidence in its
support. Therefore, the manager has stronger incentives to collect information and the boards
expertise benets shareholders (  +). In the Appendix I give conditions on  (q; q) which
guarantee  < 1 when p  1
2
. So, even in this case shareholders value is not monotonically
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increasing with the boards expertise.
II Optimal Board A¢ liation
This section relaxes the assumption that the board is maximizing the value of shareholders. I
characterizes the optimal level of board a¢ liation and show that the benet to shareholders
from appointing directors whose interests are misaligned depends on the expertise of these
directors.
In order to study the optimal a¢ liation of the board I modify the baseline model and let
the preferences of the board be uB (a; !) = v (a; !) + (1  2)  1fa=1g. Under these preferences
the board approves the project if and only if it believes the probability that ! = 1 is greater
than . The parameter of interest in this section is .17 Relative to shareholdersrst best,
if  > 1
2
then the board over-rejects the project and if   1
2
the board over-approves it.
Since the manager is biased toward the approval of the project, in the former case the board
is considered to be hostile to the manager and in the latter case it is friendly. In the baseline
model of Section I, the board was assumed to be unbiased and independent, that is,  = 1
2
.
In what follows it will become apparent that choosing  62 (0; 1) is always sub-optimal
from shareholderspoint of view. Restricting attention to  2 (0; 1) is also consistent with the
view that the boards characteristics matter only in the absence of cooperation between the
manager and the board. Indeed, if  2 (0; 1) and the manager discloses information about !
the board defers to the managers view regardless of its expertise and bias. However, if the
manager does not disclose information the board approves the project if and only if the board
is uninformed and q  , or the board is informed and its private signal s is greater than
s (q; )  l 1


1 
1 q
q

.
For a given level of posterior beliefs, the probability that the board approves the project
17Throughout the analysis it is implicitly assumed that the boards characteristics  and  are independent
of each other. A correlation between  and  may create a non-trivial trade-o¤ which is partly left out from
the present analysis.
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decreases with . Since the managers sole objective is to maximize the probability that the
project is approved, the managers expected utility in equilibrium decreases with . Yet, taking
power from the opportunistic manager does not necessarily mean that shareholders are better
o¤. A biased board makes ex-post ine¢ cient decisions. Unless the boards bias changes the
incentives of the manager to collect information and then share it with the board, shareholders
would be worse o¤ . Therefore, a biased board can benet shareholders only if consequently
the manager is incentivized to collect more information than otherwise.
Let us dene by  the bias of the board that maximizes the ex-ante value of shareholders
and is closest in absolute terms to 1
2
. The next proposition characterizes .
Proposition 3
(i) For any  2 [0; 1] there is e < 1 such that   12 for all e 2 [e; 1].
(ii) There are   0 and + > 0 such that if and only if  >  or ; p  1
2
and  < +; then
 > 1
2
for all e 2 [e; 1].
Proposition 3 demonstrates that when the manager has su¢ cient access to information (e
is high), a bias can be optimal only if the bias of the board is against the manager. That is, the
board is biased toward rejecting the project. As was mentioned in the introduction, this result
is di¤erent from the existing literature on optimal board structure that builds on the advisory
role of the board. This literature argues that in order to facilitate meaningful boardroom
discussion (cheap talk a la Crawford and Sobel (1982)), directors should be a¢ liated with the
management. In other words, an optimal board structure implies that the board is biased
toward the manager. By contrast, the present analysis highlights that shareholders obtains
the highest valuation when directors inherently take the opposite view from the management.
In this respect, the result has the spirit of Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) who show that a
benet of creating advocates within organizations is the generation of information on alternative
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policies.18
How does a stronger misalignment of interests between the board and the manager facilitate
cooperation? To see the intuition, recall that if the manager collects supportive evidence for the
project the board can be convinced to approve the project regardless of its characteristics. As
the board becomes more biased against the project, the manager realizes that the only realistic
way to convince the board to approve the project is by providing these hard evidence. Thus,
when information is hard, a wider gap between the preferences of the manager and the board
can in fact facilitate collection and revelation of information.
When the manager has su¢ cient access to information (e is high), the benet for sharehold-
ers from having a more informative decision making outweighs the possibility that the board
would reject protable projects. In the Appendix I demonstrate that when  > 0 and e < 1
(and e can be arbitrarily close to one) the cost of biasing the board can be signicant and
therefore  is bounded away from one, yet strictly above 1
2
.
Proposition 3 also highlights the interaction between the boards bias and its expertise.
Biasing the board away from maximizing shareholdersvalue is optimal when the boards ex-
pertise is high ( > ).19 Intuitively, as long as e < 1 the expert board approves the project
with a strictly positive probability. Thus, when the board is unbiased, the manager exploits
this opportunity by keeping the learning intensity relatively low. As was discussed above, bias-
ing the board against the project increases the incentives of the manager to collect and share
information, and thus, the gains to shareholders from having this bias are relatively large when
the board has expertise. Similarly, when p  1
2
but the expertise of the board is low ( < +),
the unbiased board is likely to approve the project even without any supportive evidence. Thus,
the gains from the biasing the board against the project are large in this case as well.
18See also Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2009) and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) for related contributions.
19In the Appendix I show that  < 1 if and only ifmaxq2(0;minfp; 12g)  (q; q) > q and that if limq!0
@(q;q)
@q =1
then  = 0.
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III Boards Reputation Concerns For Expertise
When shareholders have inuence on the composition of the board, directors may have in-
centives to develop reputation for being experts. This section studies the e¤ect of boards
reputation concerns on the value of the rm, and its interaction with boardroom transparency.
A Modied Setup
In order to study reputation concerns I rst reinterpret the baseline model. The board can be
of two types,  2 f0; 1g. The layman board ( = 0) is perfectly uninformed about !, whereas
the expert board ( = 1) privately observes signal s on !. The expertise of the board  is the
boards private information, but shareholders and the manager share the common prior that
the board is expert with probability  2 [0; 1].
The baseline model is also modied by augmenting the boards preferences with concerns
for reputation. In particular, uB (a; !) = v (a; !)+  (Pr [ = 1jF ]) where Pr [ = 1jF ] is share-
holders beliefs that the board is an expert conditional on the available public information
denoted by F . The function   () is the boards direct utility from reputation and it is strictly
increasing and continuous. I normalize   () by setting   (0) = 0. Furthermore, I assume that
career concerns do not entirely override the boards duciary duty to maximize its shareholders
value. Below I show that   (1) <   2 (0; 1] guarantees the existence of equilibrium.
Shareholders form their beliefs on the boards expertise solely based on its decision to
approve the project. They do not observe how much information the manager collects or
shares with the board. Later, I relax this assumption and study the e¤ect of transparency. I
also focus on shareholdersinterim beliefs and assume that they do not observe the outcome of
the project before they form their expectation, that is, F = fag. Presumably, it takes a while
until the return on the investment is realized.20
20While a 2 F is necessary for our results, 1f!=ag 62 F is not. As Lemma 5 shows, if a 2 F then concerns
for reputation distort the boards decision in equilibrium. This distortion is key for our results, and in the
Appendix I show that it exists in equilibrium even if

1f!=ag; a
	  F .
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In order to focus on the e¤ect of reputation I simplify the information structure of the
baseline model as follows. First, the manager has full access to information, e = 1. Second,
the expert board privately observes a binary signal s 2 f0; 1g where Pr [s = !j!] =  and
 2 (1=2; 1) is the precision of the boards signal. Similar to Section I, I assume that 1   <
p <  in order to ensure that the boards expertise can add value in the absence of additional
information. Importantly, all the results of the previous sections hold under the binary setup
as well.
B Analysis of Reputation Concerns
While shareholders do not observe how much information the manager collects and shares with
the board, in equilibrium, they have correct expectations. At the same time, how shareholders
form their beliefs about the boards expertise a¤ects the boards decision to approve the project,
and thereby the managers incentives to collect and share information. A solution for this xed
point problem is not always guaranteed, and an equilibrium may not exist if the board weighs
its reputation too heavily.
For example, suppose shareholders believe that an expert board is more likely to reject the
project than a layman board. If the board is very sensitive to its reputation then regardless of
its expertise the board has incentives to take the action that maximizes its reputation. Thus,
the board would reject the project even if approving it benets shareholders. The boards
behavior is therefore inconsistent with shareholdersbeliefs. At the same time, if shareholders
believe that the expert and the layman board follow the same decision rule, as long as the
board put positive weight on shareholdersvalue, both the expert and the layman board have
strict incentives to take the action that maximizes shareholders value conditional on their
private information. Because their endowment of information is heterogenous, the layman
and the expert board would behave di¤erently. Once again, this would be inconsistent with
shareholdersexpectations. All in all, an equilibrium of the game may not exist.
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The next lemma provides a su¢ cient condition for the existence of equilibrium. Hereafter
the analysis implicitly assumes that this condition is met.
Lemma 4 For any (p; ; ) there exists   2 (0; 1] such that if   (1)    an equilibrium exists.
In principle, there may exist equilibria of the game which involve o¤-equilibrium events. I
restrict these events as follows. First, I require that o¤-equilibrium beliefs are credible in the
sense of Grossman and Perry (1986). Second, shareholdersbeliefs about the boards expertise
are bounded away from zero: whenever it is optimal for the layman board to deviate to an
o¤-equilibrium action, there is a strictly positive probability that the expert board nds it
optimal to deviate as well. That is, if the layman board deviates and approves (rejects) the
project, the expert board with signal s = 1 (s = 0) must nd it optimal to deviate the same
way as well. For this reason I assume that the o¤-equilibrium beliefs cannot lie below these
lower bounds. Lemma A.9 in the Appendix shows that under these two restrictions, there are
no o¤-equilibrium events within this class of equilibria.
To solve for equilibria of the game I start with the observation that parts (i) and (ii) of
Lemma 1 continue to hold under the modied setup, and hence the functional form of q (e)
does not change. Part (iii) of Lemma 1, however, changes. Consider two cases. First, suppose
the manager discloses veriable information about !. Regardless of its expertise, the board
updates its posterior beliefs to Pr [! = 1] = m1, wherem1 = !. The board approves the project
if and only if m1  1+2 , where     (Pr [ = 1ja = 0])     (Pr [ = 1ja = 1]) is the boards
reputation gains from rejecting the project. Note that  is independent of the boards actual
expertise and it is determined in equilibrium. Thus,  is xed from the boards point of view.
The assumptions 0 =   (0) <   (1) < 1 guarantee that jj < 1 and hence the unique response
of the board is to approve the project if and only if m1 = 1. Similar to Lemma 1, the board
defers to the managers view when the latter shares information, and in this case, concerns for
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reputation do not distort the boards behavior.
By contrast, when the manager does not share information, the board forms its beliefs
based on its expertise and the inference from the managers decision not to share information.
The board approves the project if and only if l(s)
l(s)+(1 q(e))=q(e)  1+2 . If in equilibrium the
expert board is more likely to reject (approve) the project than the layman board, then  > 0
( < 0) and reputation concerns for expertise distort the boards decision toward over-rejection
(over-approval) of the project. Taking into account the manager incentives to learn and share
information, the next lemma characterizes this distortion.
Lemma 5 Conditional on non-disclosure, the board over-rejects the project ( > 0) in
equilibrium if and only if q (e) > 1
2
.
Lemma 5 suggests that in order to create the impression that board members have pri-
vate information about the prospects of the project, the layman board imitates the behavior
of the expert board. In particular, in any equilibrium shareholders correctly anticipate the
managerial learning intensity and q (e). From shareholderspoint of view, an expert board
seemingly ignores useful public information. It rejects projects which a priori seem protable,
and vis-a-versa. Nevertheless, this behavior is optimal if the boards private information is
su¢ ciently precise, 1    < p < . In order to create the impression that the board is in fact
an expert, the board under-reacts to the public information conditional on non-disclosure: it
over-approves the project when the posterior belief conditional on non-disclosure q (e) is lower
than 1
2
, and over-rejects its when q (e)  1
2
. This result is similar in spirit to Prendergast and
Stole (1996) who demonstrate that investment distortions arise from managers attempting to
inuence perceptions of their expertise by exaggerating their private information.
In what follows I argue that the manager can exploit the distortion in the boards decision
making, and hence, the main channel through which the boards concerns for reputation a¤ect
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shareholdersvalue is by changing the managers incentives to cooperate with the board.
Proposition 4 In equilibrium, concerns for reputation harm the value of shareholders if and
only if  < y where
y 
8>><>>:
1
(3 2) if p  12
1
2
if p < 1
2
(5)
Moreover, concerns for reputation increase the likelihood of projects approval unless p  1
2
and
 < y.
Proposition 4 compares between games with and without reputation concerns. To see the
intuition behind the proposition, suppose rst that   y. The likelihood the board is an
expert is relatively high. In order to maximize the probability the project is approved by
the board, the manager collects information such that the expert board is more likely than
the layman board to approve the project conditional on non-disclosure. The approval of the
project signals shareholders that the board is an expert and shareholders accordingly update
upward their beliefs about its expertise. Thus, reputation concerns create additional benets
for the board to approve the project, even if it does not add value to shareholders. The
manager anticipates this distortion and adjusts his learning intensity: he can collect more
information and at the same time keep the probability of the projects approval conditional
on non-disclosure unchanged. Similar to Section II, the boards bias can boost the incentives
of the manager to collect and share information and thereby benet shareholders. Di¤erent
from Proposition 3, however, in this section the bias benets shareholders when it is toward
the manager and not against him. Indeed, Proposition 3 does not rule out the possibility that
a bias toward the manager ( < 1
2
) would benet shareholders more than an unbiased board
( = 1
2
) would. Instead, it proves that for any bias toward the manager there is a level of
bias against the manager which yields even a higher value for shareholders, and therefore the
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optimal bias  is always against the manager. In the current section, the bias in the boards
behavior is determined endogenously by reputation concerns for expertise, and the equilibrium
put constraints on which bias can arise endogenously.
Reputation concerns can also have adverse e¤ect on welfare. For example, suppose  < y
and p < 1
2
. As in Section I, when reputation concerns are absent the board is unlikely to approve
the project unless the manager cooperates. In equilibrium, the manager has strong incentives
to collect and share information, and the board makes decisions based on the managers report
rather than on its expertise. With reputation concerns, however, the manager has fewer in-
centives to collect information. By forcing the board to make decisions based on its expertise,
the manager boosts the boards incentives to approve the project. Indeed, all else equal, when
p < 1
2
the expert board is more likely to approve the project conditional on non-disclosure.
Therefore, the approval of the project signals shareholders high expertise, and both types of
the board have additional private benets to approve the project. Overall, not only the board
over-approves the project, less information is exchanged in the boardroom. Importantly, it is
the indirect e¤ect on the managers incentives to collect and share information that dominates
and plays the key role in the welfare analysis.21
Proposition 4 suggests that in most cases the managers ability to persuade the board to
approve the project improves when the latter is subject to reputation concerns. By controlling
the amount of information and exploiting the boards sensitivity to shareholdersbeliefs, the
manager can strategically sway the board toward the projects approval. In this sense, the
friendliness of the board is endogenous. Since the interaction between shareholders and the
manager is not a zero-sum game, this increase in managerial powerdoes not necessarily come
on the expense of shareholders. Nevertheless, Proposition 4 shows that there are circumstances
21The direct e¤ect of boards reputation concerns can be measured as the change in shareholderswelfare if
one adds reputation concerns to the analysis while keeping the learning intensity on its equilibrium level in a
game without reputation concerns. In the Appendix I show that under most circumstances, and in particular
when  < y, this direct e¤ect is zero.
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where the boards concerns for reputation transfer welfare from shareholders to their manager.22
Finally, note that when the expertise of the board is believed to be low ( < 1
2
) or when the
uncertainty about it is high (  1
2
), concerns for reputation should matter the most. Neverthe-
less, since y > 1
2
, Proposition 4 implies that under those circumstances putting more pressure
on the board (and thereby increasing its awareness for reputation) would achieve exactly the
opposite outcome. This result challenges the idea that giving more power to shareholders in
determining the identity of directors is always benecial.
Boardroom Transparency
The availability of public information can change the perception of shareholders (and other
market participants) on the expertise of directors. With more information, shareholders can
better judge the boards performances and consequently change the way they form their beliefs.
Thus, when board members are concerned about their reputation, the transparency of the
interaction in the boardroom matters.
In order to explore the e¤ect of boardroom transparency I assume hereafter that the man-
agers message to the board is public and hence observable by shareholders. That is, if the
manager discloses information to the board (m1 = !) shareholders observe this message as
well. If the manager chooses not to disclose information (m1 = ), then shareholders know
that no information was disclosed.
Proposition 5 Suppose equilibrium exists with and without transparency in the boardroom.
(i) Transparency reduces the amount of (ex-ante) disclosure in equilibrium if and only if
p  1
2
and  < y.
(ii) Transparency amplies the e¤ect of reputation on shareholder value unless p < 1
2
and
22Managerial power is measured by Pr [a = 1]. In the Appendix I show that similar results hold if one measures
managerial power by Pr [a = 1j! = 0].
31
 < y.
Proposition 5 demonstrates that transparency may have adverse e¤ects even when the na-
ture of information is not proprietary. The observability of message m changes the way share-
holders form their beliefs on the board. To understand how, recall that upon disclosure the
expertise of the board plays no role and the board always nds it optimal to defer to the man-
agers view.23 With transparency, shareholders can tell whether the board approves the project
based on the managers recommendation or based on its own expertise. This feature magnies
the e¤ect of reputation and increases the boards gains or losses from reputation. Overall,
the boards endogenous bias caused by its concerns for reputation increases with transparency.
According to Proposition 4 and the discussion that follows it, this bias may have positive and
negative e¤ects on the managers incentives to collect and disclose information, and thereby
on the value of shareholders. Therefore, by magnifying the e¤ect of reputation, boardroom
transparency can decrease the amount of information that is exchanged in the boardroom and
harm welfare.
IV Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the optimal structure of the board by focusing on the expertise of its di-
rectors. I show that the expertise of the board can diminish the incentives of the manager to
collect and share information, and thereby harm shareholder value. The paper also argues that
an optimal board structure should consist of dissenting directors, and that directorsreputation
concerns can shift power from the board to the manager on the expense of shareholders.
The welfare analysis in the paper demonstrates that the adverse e¤ect of the boards ex-
pertise depends on the importance of this expertise relative to the managers input. This
observation has important empirical implications. It suggests that if the expertise of directors
23Since shareholders observe the boards action, the analysis does not change if instead shareholders know
when information is disclosed but they do not observe the content of the message.
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complements the managers knowledge it would add value to shareholders, but if it substitutes
the managers knowledge then directors expertise can actually destroy value. Thus, when
measuring the value of the expertise of the board, it is important to distinguish between these
properties. For example, politically-connected directors are likely to add value to shareholders
of a defense contractor, while directors with nancial expertise might actually destroy value in
these companies if the CEO herself has a strong background in nance. Similarly, venture cap-
ital funds, which often take board seats in their portfolio companies, are likely to add value to
these start-up companies whenever they complement the founders technological expertise with
the marketing and management know-how. The model predicts that despite the technological
knowledge that some partners in venture capital funds might have, a tendency to intervene
based on this type of expertise might in fact harm the value of the venture.
The adverse e¤ect of the boards expertise also depends on the magnitude of the conict of
interests between the manager and shareholders. If the manager is su¢ ciently aligned with the
interests of shareholders, it is straight forward that any kind of expertise on the board would
(weakly) enhance the value of the rm. However, the analysis in this paper emphasizes that
low expertise of directors can be an optimal arrangement from shareholderspoint of view even
if the manager is signicantly biased. This prediction di¤ers from stories which build on the
ability of the CEO to appoint directors, in which case, low expertise on the board is associated
with a lower shareholder value.
The analysis also provides justication for the appointment of dissenting directors in corpo-
rate boards. Inherent dissent on the board can be useful since it enhances the incentive of the
manager to collect and share information. Sharing information leads to consensus and thereby
more e¢ cient decision making of the board. This observation suggests that the presence of
stakeholders, other than shareholders, on corporate board can benet shareholders. For ex-
ample, hedge funds, employees, and creditors (but maybe suppliers and costumers as well) are
likely to disagree with shareholders and the incumbent management on strategic issues such as
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takeovers and payout policy, but at the same time they may have a relevant expertise. This
inherent disagreement, as the analysis suggests, can in fact facilitates more e¢ cient decision
making.
Finally, the analysis suggests that managers may exploit board membersdesire to demon-
strate expertise and thereby extract welfare from shareholders. The attention that directors
devote to the public perception of their expertise is a plausible reection of the recent rise in
shareholder power. Indeed, with the growing popularity of majority voting in director elections
and the increased shareholder attention to director qualications and board composition, the
re-election of directors is not automatic. The analysis highlights that this trend may have
unintended and adverse consequences. This observation is somewhat consistent with the em-
pirical evidence that the abnormal returns for rms announcing the adoption of majority voting
instead of plurality voting for director elections are insignicant (Sjostrom and Kim (2007)).
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V Appendix
The Appendix has three parts: Proofs for Sections I, II, and III. The supplemental results are
collected in a separate appendix.
A Proofs of Section I
Lemma A.1 For any q 2 [0; 1], p 2 [0; 1], and  2 (0; 1) let s (q; )  l 1


1 
1 q
q

and
 (q; p; )  1  pF1 (s (q; ))  (1  p)F0 (s (q; )) (A1)
The following holds: (i)  (q; p; ) = p (q; 1; )+(1  p) (q; 0; ); (ii)  (q; p; ) = 1, q = 1
and  (q; p; ) = 0 , q = 0; (iii)  (q; p; ) is continuous and di¤erentiable in all arguments;
(iv) @(q;p;)
@q
> 0, @(q;p;)
@p
> 0, and @(q;p;)
@
< 0.
Proof. In order to simplify exposition we use s for s (q; ). Part (i) (the linearity of  (q; p; )
in p) follows directly from expression (A1). Consider part (ii). Since F! strictly increases in s
and it is strictly positive for any s > s, we get  (q; p; ) = 1 , s = s. Given the denition
of s and the monotone likelihood ratio property (hereafter, MLRP), s = s , q = 1. A
similar (and symmetric) argument proves that  (q; p; ) = 0 , q = 0. Part (iii) follows
from the continuity and di¤erentiability of F! and f!. Finally, to see part (iv) note that
@(q;p;)
@q
=   [pf1 (s (q; )) + (1  p) f0 (s (q; ))] @s(q;)@q where @s
(q;)
@q
=  1
1  q
2 @l(s)
@s
js=s(q;)
< 0
due to the MLRP. It follows that @(q;p;)
@q
> 0 for any p 2 [0; 1] and q > 0. Since  (0; p; ) = 0
and  (q; p; ) 2 [0; 1] is continuous and di¤erentiable everywhere, @(q;p;)
@q
jq=0 > 0 as required.
A similar argument shows that @(q;p;)
@
< 0. Finally, @(q;p;)
@p
= F0 (s
 (q; )) F1 (s (q; )) and
the MLRP implies F1 (s) < F0 (s) for any s. Overall,
@(q;p;)
@p
> 0 for any q.
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider rst part (ii). Suppose on the contrary there are m02 6= m002
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and x0 6= x00 in Ie such that e (;m01 jx0) > 0, e (;m002 jx00) > 0, and Prs[ae;(;m01) (s) >
a
e;(;m002)
(s)] > 0. Recall the manager is maximizing the probability that the project is approved
by the board. Thus, for any x in Ie sending messagem002 is strictly dominated by sending message
m01. This contradicts the assumption that 

e (;m
00
2 jx00) > 0. Since any information about 
changes the boards posterior beliefs when m1 = , and consequently its decision, information
on  cannot be revealed when m1 = . Hereafter, without the loss of generality, I assume that
message m2 is ignored by the board.
Consider part (i) and suppose that q (e) = q0. Conditional on e and observing !, the
managers expected utility as a function of , the actual probability the manager chooses
m1 6= , is given by
E [uM () j!] = (1  )
h
 (q0; !) + (1  )  1fq0 12g
i
+ !
Note that q0 is independent of , and thus,
@E[uM ()j!]
@
= !    (q0; !)   (1  )  1fq0 12g.
Using Lemma A.1 part (ii), it follows that @E[uM ()j!]
@
j!=1 > @E[uM ()j!]@ j!=0. Therefore, in any
equilibrium q0  p. Since q0  p < 1, Lemma A.1 part (ii) also implies that @E[uM ()j!]@ j!=1 > 0.
That is, the manager has strict incentives to disclose ! = 1. Note that @E[uM ()j!]
@
j!=0  0 and
hence the manager has weak incentives to conceal ! = 0. While @E[uM ()j!]
@
j!=0 = 0 is feasible
(when q0 = 0 or when q0 < 12 and  = 0), playing mixed strategy at the disclosure stage cannot
change the boards approval decision (which is the objective of the manager) or the managerial
learning intensity in equilibrium. Therefore, without the loss of generality,  = ! as required.
Part (iii) follows from parts (i) and (ii) of Lemma 1 and the discussion that precedes it. To
show that q (e;m)  p ep
1 ep note that,
q (e;m)  p
R
g (j! = 1; e) [e (mj! = 1; ) + (1  e) (mj)] dP
i2f0;1g Pr [! = i]
R
g (j! = i; e) [e (mj! = i; ) + (1  e) (mj)] d
However, if m1 =  the manager did not observe ! = 1, and thus,  (mj! = 1; ) = 0 for
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any . Moreover, no information on  is revealed. Therefore, for any m = (;m2) on the
equilibrium path it must be
R
g (j! = 0; e) (mj! = 0; ) d, R g (j! = 1; e) (mj) d, andR
g (j! = 0; e) (mj) d obtain the same value. This implies q (e;m)  p ep
1 ep as required.
Proof of Lemma 2. Expression (A2) below implies @U
@
= 1 p
1 q

 (q; q; )  1fqg

and from
 (q; q; ) 2 [0; 1] it follows @U
@
 0, q < . Noting that  = 1
2
concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is given for the boards preferences that are stated in
Section II. Using q (e) = p ep
1 ep , expression (2) can be rewritten in terms of q as
U (q; )  E [uM (q; )] = 1   (1  p)
"
1

   (q; q; )  1 

 1fqg
1  q
#
(A2)
where q 2 q; p and q = p ep
1 ep .
An equilibrium exists if U (q; ) has a maximum over

q; p

. According to Lemma A.1
 (q; q; ) is continuous everywhere in q. Therefore, if p <  then U (q; ) is continuous
over q 2 q; p and a maximum exists. If p   then U (q; ) is continuous over q;  and
max

; q
	
; p

. Therefore, if U (q; ) has a maximum over

q; 

it obtains a maximum over
q; p

as well. If U (q; ) does not obtain a maximum over

q; 

then supq2[q;) U (q; ) =
limq" U (q; ). Note however that U (; )  limq" U (q; ) and therefore the maximum of
U (q; ) over

q; p

is the maximum over [; p]. Overall, U (q; ) has a maximum.
Consider part (i). Suppose p <  and for any p  x > y  q let
 (x; y)  x  y
(1  y) (x; x; )  (1  x) (y; y; ) (A3)
According to Lemma A.1  (q; p; ) increases in its rst and second argument. Thus,  (q; q; )
increases in q as well. This implies  (x; y) > 0 and U (x; ) > U (y; ),  >  (x; y). Let q 2
arg maxq2[q;p] U (q; ). There are three steps for the proof. First, I argue that  > 
0 , q  q0 .
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To see why, suppose  > 0 and by the way of contradiction q < q

0 . Since q

 is a maximizer
at  then 
 
q0 ; q


   and since q0 is a maximizer at 0 then 0    q0 ; q. Therefore,

 
q0 ; q



> 
 
q0 ; q



, a contradiction. Suppose  < 0 and by the way of contradiction,
q > q

0. Since q

 is a maximizer at  then 
 
q0 ; q


   and since q0 is a maximizer at
0 then 0    q0 ; q. Therefore,   q0 ; q <   q0 ; q, a contradiction. Second, note
that q0 = q. Otherwise, if q

0 > q then the optimality of q

0 with respect to  = 0 implies

 
q0; q
  0. This contradicts the observation that  (x; y) > 0 for any x > y. Third, note
that q1 = q if and only if 1  
 
q; q

for all q 2 q; p. Given (A3) it is equivalent to the
requirement that qmin = q. This completes part (i).
Consider part (ii) and suppose p  . According to (A2), conditional on q 2 [; p] the
optimal choice of q is independent of . I denote this choice by q+. Note that q+ is the unique
maximizer at  if and only if E [uM (q)] < E [uM (q+)] for all q 2

q; 

. This condition holds if
and only if  < + where,24
+
 
; q
  min
q2[q;]
8<: 1 (q; q; ) + (1  q) h1 (q+;q+;)
1 q+
i
9=; (A4)
If  > + then arg maxq2[q;p] U (q; ) 

q; 

and the analysis is reduced back to the case of
p < . Note that if  = + then it could be that q+ is not the unique maximizer. Note that
+ < 1 if and only if there exists q 2 q;  such that 1 (q;q;)
1 q <
1 (q+;q+;)
1 q+ . Since q
+ is the
minimizer of 1 (q;q)
1 q over [; p], then 
+ < 1, qmin < . This completes part (ii).
Proof of Corollary 1. Recall U (q; ) is the unconditional probability that the project is
approved in equilibrium. Keeping q xed, (A2) implies that U (q

; ) increases in p. Since the
manager maximizes U (q; ) he might choose q0 6= q, but only to the extent that U (q0; ) >
U (q; ). Overall, U (q

; ) strictly increases in p.
24Implicitly, it is assumed that q (p) < . Otherwise, the proposition applies for + = 1.
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If p <  then for any 2 > 1 the optimality of q2 with respect to 2 implies U
 
q2 ; 2
 
U
 
q1 ; 2

and Lemma 2 implies U
 
q1 ; 2

> U
 
q1 ; 1

. Therefore, U
 
q2 ; 2

> U
 
q1 ; 1

as required. Suppose p  . According to Proposition 1, if  < + then q = q+   for all 
in this region, where q+ is independent of . Lemma 2 implies that U (q+; ) decreases in  in
this range. If   + then q <  and the same reasoning as for the case p <  applies.
Proof of Lemma 3. Expression (4) can be rewritten as
V = 1  (1  p)

q
1  q   

q
1  q (q; 1; )   (q; 0; )

  2q   1
1  q (1  )  1fqg

(A5)
Suppose  = 1
2
. It follows,
@V
@q
=   (1  p)

1   (q; 1)  (1  )  1fq1=2g
(1  q)2   

q
1  q
@ (q; 1)
@q
  @ (q; 0)
@q

Since @(q;p)
@q
=   [pf1 (s (q)) + (1  p) f0 (s (q))] @s(q)@q for any p and s (q)  l 1

1 q
q

, it
follows that q
1 q
@(q;1)
@q
  @(q;0)
@q
= 0. Therefore, @V
@q
=   (1  p)
h
1 (q;1) (1 )1fq1=2g
(1 q)2
i
< 0 as
required. Similarly,
@V
@
= (1  p)

q
1  q
 
 (q; 1)  1fq1=2g
    (q; 0)  1fq1=2g
Since f1(s
(q))
f0(s(q))
= 1 q
q
note that
q
1  q (q; 1)   (q; 0) = f0 (s
 (q))

1  F1 (s (q))
f1 (s (q))
  1  F0 (s
 (q))
f0 (s (q))

q
1  q [ (q; 1)  1]  [ (q; 0)  1] = f0 (s
 (q))

F0 (s
 (q))
f0 (s (q))
  F1 (s
 (q))
f1 (s (q))

The MLRP implies f1(s)
1 F1(s) <
f0(s)
1 F0(s) and
F0(s(q))
f0(s(q))
> F1(s
(q))
f1(s(q))
for all s. Thus, the r.h.s of both
expressions is strictly positive and @V
@
> 0 as required.
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Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose p < 1
2
. According to Proposition 1 q0 = q (e) and by
denition q1 = qmin. Thus, according to (A5)
V (q0; 0) = 1  (1  p)
q (e)
1  q (e)
V (q1; 1) = 1  (1  p)

qmin
1  qmin (1   (qmin; 1)) +  (qmin; 0)

If  (q; q)  q for all q 2 (0; p] then qmin = q (e) = 0 when e = 1. According to Proposition
1 q increases in . Thus, q

 = 0 for all  2 [0; 1]. Therefore, V (q; ) = 1 for all  and
 = 1 by denition. Suppose instead that there is  2 (0; p] such that  (; ) > . Let
qglobal 2 arg minq2[0;p]
n
1 (q;q)
1 q
o
and note that qglobal > 0. Consider all e such that q (e) <
qglobal. In this region qmin = qglobal and hence V (q1; 1) < V (q

0; 0) if and only if
q(e)
1 q(e) <
qglobal
1 qglobal (1   (qglobal; 1)) +  (qglobal; 0). Note that the r.h.s is independent of e and the l.h.s
equals p
1 p (1  e). Therefore, there is e < 1 independent of  such that V (q1; 1) < V (q0; 0),
e 2 [e; 1]. This implies  < 1 as required.
Suppose p  1
2
. Proposition 1 implies q = q
+ for all  2 0; + where + > 0. From
Lemma 3 it follows that V
 
q+; +

> V (q+; 0), implying   + > 0.
B Proofs of Section II
Remark: For any (e; ; ) let qe;; be the equilibrium level of q (e) and V (q; ; ) be share-
holdersexpected value for a given q. The proof of Proposition 3 follows two auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma A.2 For any  2 (0; 1] and e, lim!1 qe;; = q and lim!1 V
 
qe;;; ; 

= pe +
(1  p).
Proof. Suppose on the contrary lim!1 qe;; > q. Then, there exists fng1n=1 such that
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limn!1 n = 1, q

e;;n
> q, and n > p for all n. The optimality of q

e;;n
implies U
 
q; ; n
 
U

qe;;n ; ; n

. Since n > p  qe;;n > q, it follows that 

qe;;n ; q; n

  for all
n. Lemma A.1 implies that  (q; q; n) <  (p; p; n) for all q. Thus, it follows from (A3) that
1
(p;p;n)

1 q
q
e;;n
 q

+(q;q;n)
< 

qe;;n ; q; n

. Since limn!1 qe;;n > q and limn!1  (q; q; n) =
0 for all q 2 q; p then limn!1 qe;;n ; q; n = 1, contradicting qe;;n ; q; n  .
Since lim!1 qe;; = q and lim!1  (q; p; ) = 0, according to (A5); lim!1 V
 
qe;;; ; 

=
1  (1  p) q
1 q = pe+ (1  p) as required.
Lemma A.3 Suppose there exists q0 2 (0; p] such that U
 
q0; ;
1
2

> U
 
0; ; 1
2

for  > 0.
Then, there exists e < 1 such that if e 2 [e; 1] then  > 12 .
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that for some  > 0 there exist q0 2 (0; p] such that
U
 
q0; ;
1
2

> U
 
0; ; 1
2

and feng1n=1 where limn!1 en = 1, en < 1 and n  12 for all n.
Also, let lim  limn!1 n 2

0; 1
2

and lim  limn!1 

qen;;n ; q

en;;

n
; n

2 [0; 1].
I start by arguing that limn!1 qen;;n = 0. To see why, note that the optimality of
n implies V

qen;;n ; ; 

n

 V  qen;;; ;  for all n and  > 12 . Lemma A.2 implies
lim!1 V
 
qen;;; ; 

= pen+(1  p). Let f0ng such that limn!1 0n = 1. Then, V

qen;;n ; ; 

n


V
 
qen;;; ; 
0
n

for large n and limn!1 V

qen;;n ; ; 

n

= 1. This implies limn!1 qen;;n = 0
as required.
Next, consider two cases. First, suppose lim = 0. Since 

lim  12 , the denitions of
 (q; q; ) and s (q; ) imply that limn!1
n
1 n
1 q
en;;

n
q
en;;

n
= 1. Since limn!1 qen;;n = 0 then
qen;;n converges to zero faster than 

n. Thus, min fn; q0g > qen;;n for su¢ ciently large
n. The optimality of qen;;n implies U (q0; ; 

n)  U

qen;;n ; ; 

n

for su¢ ciently large
n. Thus, in the limit,  (q0; q0; 

lim) +
1 

 1fq0limg 
q0

. However, the assumption that
U
 
q0; ;
1
2

> U
 
0; ; 1
2

implies q0

< 
 
q0; q0;
1
2

+ 1 

 1fq0 12g. Since 

lim  12 and  (q; q; )
strictly decreases in  we get a contradiction.
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Second, suppose lim > 0. Since limn!1 q

en;;

n
= 0, the denitions of  (q; q; ) and
s (q; ) imply lim = 0. Note that 

lim < 1 since if 

lim = 1 then the probably of approval
conditional on non-disclosure converges to one. This implies limn!1 V

qen;;n ; ; 

n

= p.
However, in this case and according to (A5), as long as  > 0 shareholders get strictly more
than p for any q if they set  = 1
2
. Therefore, lim < 1. The optimality of q

en;;

n
implies
that U (q0; ; 

n)  U

qen;;n ; ; 

n

for large n. Since lim = 0 = limn!1 q

en;;

n
the limit
of U (q0; ; 

n)  U

qen;;n ; ; 

n

implies lim  1   1   1
n
limn!1
q
en;;

n
n
 1
o
 1, a
contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose  = 0 and note that based on (A2) and (A5) U =
1  1 p
1 q  1fq<g and V = 1  (1  p)
q (2q 1)1fqg
1 q . It follows that q
 = q if  > p and otherwise
q 2 [; p]. Let e=0 = max
n
2p 1
p
; 0
o
and note that e0 < 1. If p < 12 then  =
1
2
implies q = q
and hence  = 1
2
for all e. Suppose p > 1
2
and e > e=0. If   p then q   and V (q) = p.
If  > p then q = q and V (q) = 1   (1  p) q
1 q = 1   p + ep. Thus,  > 12 if and only if
1  p+ ep > p, e > e=0. This completes the proof for  = 0.
Suppose  > 0. Based on (A3) and (A4) dene   infq2(0;minfp; 12g]
q
(q;q; 12)
and + 
+
 
1
2
; 0

. Note that + > 0. I start by proving that if p < 1
2
and   , or p  1
2
and
 2 +; , then q
e=1;;= 1
2
= 0. First, if p < 1
2
then U
 
q; 0;  = 1
2

< U
 
0; 0;  = 1
2

for
all q 2 (0; p]. Second, if 0 <    then U  q; ;  = 1
2

< U
 
0; ;  = 1
2

for any q 2 
0;min

p; 1
2
	
. Third, if   + then by denition of + there is q 2 0; 1
2

such that
U
 
q+; ;  = 1
2

< U
 
q; ;  = 1
2

. Combined, the three cases establish the argument.
Next, I show that if p < 1
2
and   , or p  1
2
and  2 +; , there is e < 1 such
that if e 2 [e; 1] then qe=1;;= 1
2
= q (e). To see why, note that previous argument established
that the global maximum of U
 
q; ; 1
2

over [0; p] is obtained at q = 0. Since U
 
q; ; 1
2

is
continuous in q at the neighborhood of zero, for small " > 0, the global maximum of U
 
q; ; 1
2

over ["; p] is obtained at q = ". Let e be such that q (e) = ". Then for any e 2 [e; 1] the
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global maximum of U
 
q; ; 1
2

over [q (e) ; p] is obtained at q = q (e) as required. We conclude
that when the board is unbiased, under the conditions above, the managerial learning intensity
is at its highest level and therefore shareholders cannot benet from a biased board, that is,
 = 1
2
.
If  >  there is q0 2
 
0;min

p; 1
2
	
such that  > 
 
q; 0; 1
2

. If p  1
2
and  < +
there is q0 2

1
2
; p

such that 1 > 
 
q0; 0;
1
2

. Either way, there exists q0 2 (0; p] such that
U
 
q0; ;
1
2

> U
 
0; ; 1
2

and Lemma A.3 establishes the result.
C Proofs of Section III
Remark: The proofs of this section rely on Lemma A.4 which provides implicit conditions for
the existence of equilibria and characterizes them.
Lemma A.4
(i) There is an equilibrium in which q = 0 if and only if p  1
2
and   1
2
. In this
equilibrium,  = 0 and conditional on non-disclosure, the board rejects the project with
probability one.
(ii) There is an equilibrium in which q = 1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
if and only if either
max

1   (3  2)
(1  ) (2   1) ;
p  
p (1  ) +  (1  p)

<  < min f0; 2   1; 2p  1g (A8)
or
2p  1 <  < min f0; 2   1g (A9)
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where  satises
   
 
1
1 + 1 

1
q(1 )+(1 q)
!
   
0BB@ 1
1 + 1 

p q
1 p
p q
1 p +[q
+(1 q)(1 )]
1CCA (A10)
In this equilibrium, conditional on non-disclosure, the board approves the project the if
and only if s = 1.
(iii) There is an equilibrium in which q = 1+

2
if and only if
0 <   min

1  
1 +  (1  2) ;
1   (3  2)
(1  ) (2   1) ; 2p  1

(A11)
where  satises
 =   (1)   
0BB@ 1
1 + 1 

p q
1 p +1
p q
1 p +[q
+(1 q)(1 )]
1CCA (A12)
In this equilibrium, conditional on non-disclosure, the board rejects the project if and only
if s = 0.
(iv) There is no other equilibrium.
Proof. Shareholders beliefs depend only on a but not on e or m, and hence from the
manager and the boards point of view, they are xed. Let  be the equilibrium value of
  (Pr [ = 1ja = 0])   (Pr [ = 1ja = 1]) and not that   (1) < 1 guarantees that  2 ( 1; 1).
I start by noting that unless q = p then in equilibrium the board (both the layman and the
expert) plays a pure strategy. Otherwise, the manager will always nd it optimal to marginally
increase q and thereby discretely increase the probably that the project is approved.
Suppose the manager chooses q and does not disclose the information. Recall that condi-
tional on non-disclosure the layman board approves the project if and only if q  1+
2
. The
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expert board with signal s 2 f0; 1g approves the project if and only if q > 1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
when
s = 1 and if and only if q > 1
1+ 1 

1 
1+
when s = 0. Thus, the probability the board approves
the project conditional on non-disclosure is
 (q; p;) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if q < 1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
p + (1  p) (1  ) if q 2

1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
; 1
1+ 1 

1 
1+

1 if q  1
1+ 1 

1 
1+
(A13)
The managers expected utility is given by
E [uM (q;)] = 1   (1  p)
" 1

   (q; q;)  1 

 1fq 1+2 g
1  q
#
(A14)
From (A13) and (A14) it follows that the manager optimal decision of q is either zero,min

1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
; p

,
min

1+
2
; p
	
, or min

1
1+ 1 

1 
1+
; p

.
According to Lemma A.9 in no equilibrium the project is approved with probability one.
Therefore, q = 1
1+ 1 

1 
1+
is never an equilibrium. This establishes part (iv) of the Lemma.
Moreover, if 1
1+ 1 

1 
1+
 p the manager has strict incentives to deviate to q = 1
1+ 1 

1 
1+
and
obtain the highest welfare possible, one. Therefore, I must require that in any equilibrium
1
1+ 1 

1 
1+
> p which holds if and only if
 >
p  
p (1  ) +  (1  p) (A15)
According to (A14) and for any  2 ( 1; 1) it follows that E [uM (0;)] > E

uM
 
1+
2
;

if and only if
 >
1  
1 +  (1  2) ; (A16)
49
E [uM (0;)] > E

uM

1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
;

if and only if
 > 2   1; (A17)
E

uM
 
1+
2
;

> E

uM

1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
;

if and only if
 <
1   (3  2)
(1  ) (2   1) : (A18)
Consider an equilibrium in which q = 0. In this equilibrium, regardless of its expertise,
the board approves the project conditional on disclosure and rejects the project conditional on
non-disclosure and, therefore,  = 0. Condition (A15) does not bind when  = 0. Condition
(A16) implies that the option q > 1
2
, if feasible, always dominates q = 0. Hence, this equilibrium
exits only if p  1
2
(if q = p = 1
2
the layman board is indi¤erent and hence I assume that he
would reject the project). When p < 1
2
, condition (A17) requires that 2  1 < 0. I conclude,
an equilibrium with q = 0 exists if and only if p < 1
2
and 2   1 < 0. This establishes part
(i).
Consider an equilibrium in which q = 1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
. In this equilibrium, the layman board
rejects the project conditional on non-disclosure and hence < 0 . The option q = 1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
is feasible if and only if p  1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
. Since p > 1    this condition never binds given the
requirement that  < 0. Condition (A15) and the reversed of condition (A17) imply that it
is necessary that
p  
p (1  ) +  (1  p) < 
 < min f0; 2   1g
If 1+

2
 p then I also need to require the reversed of condition (A18). This yields condition
(A8). If 1+

2
> p then the option q = 1+

2
is not feasible and noting that 2p 1 > p 
p(1 )+(1 p)
yields condition (A9). Moreover, in order to be consistent with shareholdersexpectation, 
must be the xed point of (A10). Note that the r.h.s of (A10) decreases in , it is strictly
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negative, and bounded away from below from minus one. Therefore, there exists a unique
solution for (A10). This establishes part (ii).
Consider an equilibrium in which q = 1+

2
. In this equilibrium, the layman board approves
the projects with probability one and hence  > 0. If  > 0 then (A15) does not bind. The
option q = 1+

2
is feasible if and only if p  1+
2
. Combining condition (A18) and the
reversed of condition (A16) yields condition (A11). Moreover, in order to be consistent with
shareholdersexpectation,  must be the xed point of (A12). Note that the r.h.s of (A12) is
increasing in , strictly positive, and it is bounded away from above from 1. Therefore, there
exists a solution to (A12). This establishes part (iii).
Proof of Lemma 4. There are several cases to consider. First, suppose p  1
2
and  < 1
2
,
and let    1. Part (i) of Lemma A.4 guarantees that if   (1)    then an equilibrium in which
q = 0 exists. Second, suppose p < 1
2
and 1
2
<  < 1
(3 2) , and let
   1 2p. If   (1) <   the
a solution for (A10) must be strictly negative and greater than    and hence satises condition
(A9). Part (ii) of Lemma A.4 guarantees that an equilibrium in which q = 1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
exists.
Third, suppose p > 1
2
and  < 1
(3 2) , and let
   min
n
1 
1+(1 2) ;
1 (3 2)
(1 )(2 1) ; 2p  1
o
. Note
that   > 0. If   (1) <   the a solution for (A12) must be strictly positive and smaller
than   and hence satises condition (A11). Therefore, Part (iii) of Lemma A.4 guarantees
that an equilibrium in which q = 1+

2
exists. Finally suppose   1
(3 2) and let
  
 max
n
1 (3 2)
(1 )(2 1) ;
p 
p(1 )+(1 p)
o
. Note that   > 0. If   (1) <   the a solution for (A10)
must be strictly negative and greater than   . This implies that either (A8) (if p < 1
2
) or (A9)
(if p  1
2
) hold. Part (ii) of Lemma A.4 guarantees that an equilibrium in which q = 1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
exists.
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose in equilibrium   0, Lemma A.4 implies that either q = 0
or q = 1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
. In the latter case, q  1
2
if and only if   2   1. Since   0 and
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 > 1
2
then q < 1
2
. Suppose in equilibrium  > 0. Lemma A.4 implies that either q = 1+

2
or q = 1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
. In the former case,  > 0 ) q > 1
2
. In the latter case, part (ii) of the
Lemma A.4 requires  > 2p   1. Since  > p then in such equilibrium it is necessary that
 > 2  1 as well. As was argued above, this implies q > 1
2
. Either way,  > 0 if and only
if q > 1
2
.
Proof of Proposition 4. I start by proving the statement on the likelihood of the projects
approval. I compare the unconditional probability that the project is approved in equilibria
when   satises the assumptions of Section III, with equilibria in which    0 and hence there
are no reputation concerns. In that case, conditions (A10) and (A12) in Lemma A.4 are not
required as is determined independently of shareholdersexpectations of the boards behavior
and is xed exogenously to be zero. Therefore, for most parts (ignoring the strict inequalities
in conditions (A8), (A9), and (A11)), Lemma A.4 also includes the case of   0.
There are several cases to consider. First, suppose p < 1
2
and  < 1
2
. Conditions (A8)
and (A11) are violated for any . Thus, if   0 then Lemma A.4 implies q = 0 is the only
equilibrium. With reputation concerns, Lemma A.4 implies that either q = 0 or q = 1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
where (A9) must hold (that is,  < 0). If q = 0 then the managers expected utility is p
whether or not the board has reputation concerns. If q = 1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
then according to (A17)
the managers expected utility is strictly greater than p if and only if  < 2  1. Condition
(A9) implies that  < 2   1 and hence in this region the manager weakly gains power.
Second, suppose p < 1
2
and   1
2
or p  1
2
and   1
(3 2) . Condition (A11) is violated
for any . If   0 then conditions (A9) or (A8) are satised and hence in the absence
of reputation concerns the manager chooses q = 1   . With reputation concerns, Lemma
A.4 implies that necessarily q = 1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
< 1    where  < 0. In both scenarios and
conditional on non-disclosure the board approves the project if and only if s = 1. However, in
the former case, the manager collects less information (q is higher) and hence the probability
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of disclosing ! = 1 is strictly lower. Therefore, the overall probability of projects approval is
higher when the board has reputation concerns.
Last, suppose p  1
2
and  < 1
(3 2) . Conditions (A8) and (A9) are violated for any .
If   0 then condition (A11) is satised and hence in the absence of reputation concerns
the manager chooses q = 1
2
. With reputation concerns, Lemma A.4 implies that necessarily
q = 1+

2
> 1
2
. In both scenarios and conditional on non-disclosure the board rejects the
project if and only if s = 0. However, in the former case, the manager collects more information
(q is higher) and hence the probability of disclosing ! = 1 is strictly higher. Therefore, the
overall probability of projects approval is lower when the board has reputation concerns. This
completes the proof.
Consider the statement on shareholdersvalue. According to (A5), for a given level of q and
 shareholdersvalue satises
V (q;) = 1  (1  p)

q
1  q   

q
1  q (q; 1;)   (q; 0;)

  2q   1
1  q (1  )  1fq 1+2 g

(A19)
where  (q; p;) is given by (A13). Note that V (0;) = 1 for any and that V

1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
;

and V
 
1+
2
;

decrease in . The arguments in the previous paragraphs reveal that in
equilibrium:
1. If p < 1
2
and  < 1
2
then q = 0 when the board has no concerns for reputation, and
otherwise q 2

0; 1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+

where  < 0 .
2. If p  1
2
and  < 1
(3 2) then q
 = 1
2
when the board has no concerns for reputation, and
otherwise q = 1+

2
where  > 0.
3. Else, q = 1  when the board has no concerns for reputation, and otherwise q = 1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
where  < 0.
It follows that in the rst and the second cases shareholderswelfare decreases when the
board has reputation concerns, and in the third case, it strictly increases.
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Proof of Proposition 5. The analysis with transparency is not fundamentally di¤erent from
the analysis without transparency. The main di¤erence comes form how shareholders update
their beliefs given the boards action. In particular, Lemma A.4 applies with the following
adjustments. First, condition (A10) becomes
   
 
1
1 + 1 

1
q(1 )+(1 q)
!
    (1) (A20)
and condition and (A12) becomes
 =   (1)   
 
1
1 + 1 

1
q+(1 q)(1 )
!
(A21)
In both cases,  is bigger in absolute terms compared to the original and corresponding
terms in Lemma A.4.25 In addition, unlike Lemma A.9, o¤-equilibrium events could potentially
matter, since conditional on non-disclosure the board might, for example, reject the project
with probability one. Nevertheless, as long as 0    (0) <   (1) < 1 then it is guaranteed that
 < 1 and, as I argue next, the set of equilibria is generically the same. Indeed, consider an
equilibrium in which q = 0 and note that even the most optimistic board, an expert board with
signal s = 1, will reject the project as long as 0 < 1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
,  < 1
2 1 which always holds
when  2  1
2
; 1

and  < 1. Thus, regardless of the o¤-equilibrium beliefs, this equilibrium
exists under the same conditions as in Lemma A.4 part (i). All other equilibria do not involve o¤-
equilibrium beliefs and hence the only di¤erence comes from conditions (A20) and (A21). Note
that since for a given set of parameters jj is higher with transparency, conditions (A8), (A9),
and (A11) are less likely to be satised. So sometimes an equilibrium without transparency
could exist where an equilibrium with transparency does not. Nevertheless, Lemma 5 can be
easily modied to account for transparency. In what follows I restrict attention to parameters
25Note that condition (A12) does not guarantee a unique solution but condition (A21) does.
54
such that equilibrium with and without transparency exists.
Consider the proof of Proposition 4. It shows that in equilibrium  > 0 if and only if
p  1
2
and  < 1
(3 2) . Since q
 increases with  and since transparency increases jj then
transparency reduces the amount of information that is collected by the manager in equilibrium
(that is, a higher q) if and only if p  1
2
and  < 1
(3 2) . Noting that the ex-ante likelihood of
disclosure is ep, completes the rst part of the proposition. The proof of Proposition 4 also shows
that V (q () ;) decrease in  and that reputation concerns harm shareholdersvalue if
and only if  < y where y is given by (5). Thus, if p < 1
2
and   1
2
, or p  1
2
and   1
(3 2) ,
then shareholdersvalue increases when the board has reputation and  < 0. Therefore, lower
 amplies the positive e¤ect of reputation. When p  1
2
and  < 1
(3 2) then shareholders
value decreases when the board has reputation and  > 0. Therefore, higher  amplies the
negative e¤ect of reputation. Only when p < 1
2
and  < 1
2
then shareholdersvalue decreases
when the board has reputation and  < 0. In that case, transparency mitigates the negative
e¤ect of reputation. This establishes the result.
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D Supplemental Results
Lemma A.5 Let h (j) be any strictly positive and continuous probability density function over
1
2
; 1

where  2  is a compact set of parameters. Then, for any ! 2 f0; 1g and s 2 [0; 1]
f! (sj) 
h
h (1  sj)  1fs 12g + h (sj)  1fs> 12g
i
[!s+ (1  !) (1  s)]
is a valid probability density function and it satises the MLRP. Moreover, there exists a non-
zero measure set of parameters 0   such that for any  2 0 there are 0  p1 () < p2 () 
1
2
and p3 () 2
 
1
2
; 1

such that if p 2 (p1 () ; p2 ()) [ (p3 () ; 1) then  (p; pj) > p.
Proof. I omit  to ease the exposition. First note that f! (s) is a valid density function.
Indeed, given the properties of h () then f! (s) is also strictly positive and continuous function,
and
Z 1
0
f! (s) ds =
Z 1
2
0
h (1  s) [!s+ (1  !) (1  s)] ds+
Z 1
1
2
h (s) [!s+ (1  !) (1  s)] ds
=
Z 1
1
2
h (s) [! (1  s) + (1  !) s] ds+
Z 1
1
2
h (s) [!s+ (1  !) (1  s)] ds
=
Z 1
1
2
h (s) ds = 1
Second, note that the likelihood function is given by l (s) = s
1 s and hence s
 (p) = 1  p. For
any p 2 [0; 1] I have
 (p; p) =
Z 1
1 p
[pf1 (s) + (1  p) f0 (s)] ds
Let  =

0; 1
4
2
and  = (; ") and suppose
R 1 
1
2
+
h (s) ds = 1   ". Consider p 2  1
2
 ; 1
2

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then
 (p; p) =
Z 1
1 p
h (s) [sp+ (1  s) (1  p)] ds >
Z 1 
1
2
+
h (s) [sp+ (1  s) (1  p)] ds
>
Z 1 
1
2
+
h (s) [(1 ) p+  (1  p)] ds = [(1 ) p+  (1  p)] (1  ")
Thus,  (p; p) > p, p < (1 ")
1 (1 2)(1 ") where
(1 ")
1 (1 2)(1 ") 2
 
0; 1
2

. Thus, if " < min
n
42
(1 2)2+2 ;
1
4
o
then the interval
h
1
2
 ; (1 ")
1 (1 2)(1 ")
i
is not empty and (p1; p2) as in the statement do exist.
Consider p 2 [1 ; 1] then
 (p; p) =
Z 1
2
1 p
h (1  s) [ps+ (1  p) (1  s)] ds+
Z 1
1
2
h (s) [ps+ (1  p) (1  s)] ds
=
Z 1
p
h (s) [ps+ (1  p) (1  s)] ds+
Z p
1
2
h (s) ds >

p2 + (1  p)2 Z 1
p
h (s) ds+
Z p
1
2
h (s) ds
=
Z 1
p
h (s) ds  2p (1  p)
Z 1
p
h (s) ds+
Z p
1
2
h (s) ds = 1  2p (1  p)
Z 1
p
h (s) ds
Note that 1 2p (1  p) R 1
p
h () d > p, 1
2p
>
R 1
p
h () d. But if p > 1  then R 1
p
h () d <
" and therefore,
R 1
p
h () d < " < 1
2
 1
2p
. Thus p3 as required exists as well.
Lemma A.6 If p 6=  then e increases in p.
Proof. Suppose p 6=  and consider a small increase in p. Unless the constraint q  p binds,
(A2) implies that q is invariant to p. Therefore, e
 must increase in order to keep q on the
same level of q. If q = p then e = 0 and it can only increase.
Lemma A.7 (Supplement to Proposition 2)
(i) V (; e) increases with e.
(ii) If p  1
2
, e = 1, and 1 < maxq2(0; 12)
n
(q;q)
q
o
< minq2[ 12 ;p]
n
1 (q;q)
1 q
o
then  < 1.
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Proof. Consider part (i). If e is higher then the manager can also choose from

q   "; q. By
revealed preferences, and since the choice of q is still available, the manager will potentially
switch to q 2 q   "; q. Therefore, q is decreases in e. According to Lemma 3, this implies
that V (; q) increases with e.
Consider part (ii). First, if 1 < maxq2(0; 12)
n
(q;q)
q
o
then there exists q0 2  0; 1
2

such
that 1 (q
0;q0)
1 q0 < 1. This implies q

1 = qmin > 0: Second, since 1 < minq2[ 12 ;p]
n
1 (q;q)
1 q
o
then
1 (q0;q0)
1 q0 < minq2[ 12 ;p]
n
1 (q;q)
1 q
o
. Hence, if  = 1 the manager strictly prefers q0 > 0 over any
q 2 1
2
; p

. Thus, qmin < 12 and 
+ < 1. Moreover, q1 > 0 ) V (q1; 1) < 1. Third, according
to (A4), + satises
1
+
 (q
+
;q
+
)
1 q
+
= minq2[ 12 ;p]
n
1 (q;q)
1 q
o
where q
+
2 arg minq2[0; 12)
1
+
 (q;q)
1 q .
If on the contrary q
+
> 0 then 1
+
>
1
+
 (q
+
;q
+
)
1 q
+
and hence
(q
+
;q
+
)
q
+
> 1
+
. Overall,
(q
+
;q
+
)
q
+
= minq2[ 12 ;p]
n
1 (q;q)
1 q
o
which contradicts maxq2(0; 12)
n
(q;q)
q
o
< minq2[ 12 ;p]
n
1 (q;q)
1 q
o
.
I conclude that q
+
= 0 and hence V
 
q
+
; +

= 1 > V (q1; 1) implying that 
 < 1.
Lemma A.8 (Supplement to Proposition 3)
(i)   1 if and only if there exists q 2  0;minp; 1
2
	
such that 
 
q; q; 1
2
  q. If
limq!0
@(q;q; 12)
@q
=1 then  = 0.
(ii) Suppose p > 1
2
and limq!0
@(q;q;0)
@q
< 1 for 0  p+12 .26 Then, there exist 0 2
 
0; +

and e0 < 1 such that 
 2  1
2
; 0

for all for all e 2 (e0 ; 1).
Proof. Consider part (i). Note that by its denition   1 if and only if there exists
q 2  0;minp; 1
2
	
such that 
 
q; q; 1
2
  q. Also, since q
(q;q; 12)
> 0 for all q > 0, then
infq2(0;minfp; 12g]
q
(q;q; 12)
= 0 if and only if limq!0
q
(q;q; 12)
= 0. The latter holds if and only
limq!0
@(q;q; 12)
@q
=1.
Consider part (ii) and let 0 2

0;min

1 + maxq2[0;p]
@(q;q;0)
@q
 1
; +

. Since @(q;q;0)
@q
>
0, F! is continuous, and limq!0
@(q;q;0)
@q
< 1 then 0 is well dened. Recall, the man-
26Note that limq!0
@(q;q;)
@q <1 if, for example, Fi = Fi (x) = 1  e ix and 0 > 1.
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ager chooses q 2 [q (e) ; p] that maximizes U (q; ; ). When  > p this is equivalent to
minimizing 1 (q;q;)
1 q . Note that this function is di¤erentiable and its derivative is given by
  @(q;q;)
@q
(1 q)+[1 (q;q;)]
(1 q)2 . If  = 0 and  = 0 then the assumption 0 <
1
1+maxq2[0;p]
@(q;q;0)
@q
implies that this derivative is strictly positive on [q (e) ; p]. Thus, the manager chooses q (e),
the highest learning intensity. According to Proposition 3 Part (ii), there is e0 < 1 such that
 > 1
2
for all e 2 (e0 ; 1). Suppose e 2 (e0 ; 1) and note that based on the argument above the
manager chooses q (e) when  = 0 and  = 0. Since 0 >
1
2
then any  > 0 yields a strictly
lower value for shareholder (more over-rejection). Therefore,  2  1
2
; 0

as required.
Lemma A.9 (Equilibrium Selection) In any equilibrium (subject to the restrictions of Sec-
tion III in the main text) the probability that the project is approved is strictly between zero and
one.
Proof. Recall that Pr [a = 1] is the managers expected utility. The manager can always choose
e = e, learn with probability ep that ! = 1, disclose this information to the board, and thereby
guarantee the approval of the project. Thus, in any equilibrium Pr [a = 1]  ep > 0. Next,
suppose on the contrary that Pr [a = 1] = 1. The proof proceeds in several steps.
First, I argue that the probability of non-disclosure is strictly positive. Otherwise, given
Lemma 1, it must be that e = 1 and the manager discloses information about ! regardless of
its realization. If so, there is a strictly positive probability that ! = 0 and therefore, a strictly
positive probability that the board rejects the project, a contradiction.
Second, let T (x; )  1  (x)+ ()
1+ (x)  () and note that conditional on non-disclosure the board
with signal s = 0 has the highest incentives to reject the project. Since the board with signal
s = 0 approves the project, it is necessary that
T (^; )  1  q
q

1   (A6)
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where ^  Pr [ = 1ja = 0] is o¤-equilibrium beliefs conditional on a = 0. Given the assumption
p <  and the observation q  p, it follows that 1 q
q

1  > 1. Thus, (A6) implies T (^; ) > 1
which holds if and only if ^ < . Note that conditional on observing a = 0 the worst beliefs
shareholders can have on  are formed when the board approves the project if and only if s = 1.
These beliefs are given by   1
1+ 1 

1
q(1 )+(1 q)
2 (0; ). Thus, I require ^ 2 [; ].
Third, o¤-equilibrium beliefs ^ are not credible if the following condition holds: there exists
0 such that if conditional on the observation that a = 0 shareholdersbeliefs switch from ^ to
0 and at the same time it is optimal for the board to behaves consistently with those beliefs
given the managers equilibrium e¤ort. In what follows I demonstrate that any beliefs ^ 2 [; ]
are not credible in the above sense. Consider alterative beliefs in which shareholders expect
that the expert board approves the project if and only if s = 1 and the layman board approves
the project with probability . Then, Pr [ = 1ja = 0] is given by
0 ()  1
1 + 1 

1 
q(1 )+(1 q)
(A7)
Note that 0 () spans [; 1] and it increases in . Suppose on the contrary that there are
credible beliefs ^ 2 [; ]. If  = 0 then the credibility of ^ implies that either the board with
signal s = 1 has strict incentives to reject the project or the layman board has strict incentives
to approve it. The former case holds if and only if T (; ) < 1 q
q
1 

and the latter case holds
if and only if T (; ) > 1 q
q
. Since T (^; )  1 q
q

1  (condition (A6)), ^  , and T (x; ) is
decreasing in x, then T (; )  1 q
q

1  . If  = 1 then the credibility of ^ implies that either
the board with signal s = 0 has strict incentives to approve the project or the layman board
has strict incentives to reject it. The former case holds if and only if T (1; ) > 1 q
q

1  and the
latter case holds if and only if T (1; ) < 1 q
q
. Thus, it has to be that T (1; ) 62
h
1 q
q
; 1 q
q

1 
i
.
If  2 (0; 1) then the credibility of ^ implies that it has to be that T (0 () ; ) 6= 1 q
q
. That
is, the layman board is not indi¤erent. Since T (x; ) is decreasing in x and 0 () spans
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[; 1] then either T (; ) < 1 q
q
or T (1; ) > 1 q
q
. Since T (; )  1 q
q

1  >
1 q
q
it must be
that T (1; ) > 1 q
q
. Since T (1; ) 62
h
1 q
q
; 1 q
q

1 
i
, I conclude that 1 q
q

1  < T (1; ). Since
1 q
q

1  > 1 then T (1; ) > 1,   () >   (1) which never holds, a contradiction.
Lemma A.10 (Small Direct E¤ect) Consider the model in Section III. If p < 1
2
or
  1

1+(2 1)2
(3 2)+(2 1)2 then in any equilibrium the direct e¤ect of boards reputation concerns on
shareholderswelfare is zero. In all other circumstances, the direct e¤ect is strictly negative
only if   (1) is su¢ ciently large.
Proof. The direct e¤ect of boards reputation concerns measures the change in shareholders
value while keeping the managers e¤ort in collecting information on its equilibrium level in
the absence of reputation concerns. Consider the three cases that are mentioned in the proof
of Proposition 4. In case 1, q = 0 in the absence of reputation concerns. According to (A19)
V (0;) is invariant to  and hence reputation has no direct e¤ect on shareholderswelfare.
In case 2, q = 1
2
in the absence of reputation concerns, and q = 1+

2
> 1
2
with reputation
concerns. Moreover, according to Lemma A.4 part (iii), condition (A11) must hold. Therefore,
0 <   2p 1. Since p <  then < 2 1. Note that 1
2
2

1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
; 1
1+ 1 

1 
1+

if and only
if jj < 2   1 which holds. Therefore, according to (A19) and (A13) V  1
2
;

= V
 
1
2
; 0

and there is no direct e¤ect.
In case 3, q = 1    in the absence of reputation concerns, and q = 1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
< 1   
with reputation concerns. Lemma A.4 part (ii) implies that either (A8) or (A9) holds. This
implies that 1   2

1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
; 1
1+ 1 

1 
1+

. Thus, according to (A19) and (A13) I have
V (1  ;) = V (1  ; 0)  2 (1  )  1

(1  )  1f1 2g
If  > 1  2 then reputation has no direct e¤ect on shareholdersvalue, and otherwise, the
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direct e¤ect is negative. Note that if p < 1
2
and 1
(3 2) >  >
1
2
then condition (A9) is
satised but not condition (A8). Since 1  2 < 2p  1 if and only if 1  < p then in this case
1    < 1+
2
and there is no direct e¤ect. If   1
(3 2) then the combination of conditions
(A8) and (A9) becomes
max

1   (3  2)
(1  ) (2   1) ;
p  
p (1  ) +  (1  p)

<  < 0 (A22)
Note that p 
p(1 )+(1 p) > 1   2 , p < 12 . Hence, if p < 12 then  > 1   2 and there is
no direct e¤ect. Note that 1 (3 2)
(1 )(2 1) < 1   2 ,  > 1+(2 1)
2
(3 2)+(2 1)2 and the latter term is
greater than 1
(3 2) . Thus, if p  12 and  > 1+(2 1)
2
(3 2)+(2 1)2 there are reputation functions for
which  < 1  2 and (A22) is satised. For these functions, the direct e¤ect is negative.
Lemma A.11 Consider the model in Section III.
(i) If p < 1
2
,   1
2
, and F = fa; vg then there exists   such that in equilibrium the boards
decision making is distorted.
(ii) If F = fvg then there is no equilibrium in which the boards decision making is distorted.
Proof. Suppose F = fa; vg and consider an equilibrium in which conditional on non-disclosure
the board approves the project if and only if it is expert and observes s = 1. Let L (a; v) 
Pr [ = 1ja; v]. It can be veried that L (1; 1) = 1
1+ 1 

e
e+(1 e)
, L (1; 0) = 1, L (0; 1) = 1
1+ 1 

1
1 
,
and L (0; 0) = 1
1+ 1 

1

. For example, if (a; v) = (1; 0) then shareholders infer that ! = 0 and
that information was not disclosed. Therefore, it must be the board is an expert. Also, note
that L increases in a and decreases in v. Let q (e; s) be the boards beliefs conditional on
non-disclosure and conditional on its private information, if exists. Note that
E [uB (a; !) js] =
8>><>>:
q (e; s) [1 +   (L (1; 1))] + (1  q (e; s))   (L (1; 0)) if a = 1
q (e; s)   (L (0; 1)) + (1  q (e; s)) [1 +   (L (0; 0))] if a = 0
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Thus, in this proposed equilibrium and given e, the board approves the project if and only if
q (e; s)  1+(e)
2
where e is the equilibrium level of e¤ort and
 (e) =
  (L (0; 0))    (L (1; 0))    (L (1; 1)) +   (L (0; 1))
2 +   (L (0; 0))    (L (1; 0)) +   (L (1; 1))    (L (0; 1)) (A23)
and note that only L (1; 1) is a function of e and that  (e) < 0. So, the board is biased
toward approval of the project. In equilibrium  (e) is xed from the managers and the
boards point of view. Lemma A.4 part (ii) can be applied with the exception that instead of
condition (A10), condition (A23) must hold where e satises q (e) = 1
1+ 
1 
1 
1+
. Note that
q (e) increases with  and hence e decreases with . Since L (1; 1) decreases in e and   is an
increasing function, then the r.h.s of (A23) is decreasing in . Therefore, a solution exists for
the above xed problem. Last, as in Lemma A.4, conditions (A8) and (A9) must hold. Since
p < 1
2
and   1
2
then condition (A9) holds. Moreover, note that if   (1) > 0 is su¢ ciently
small, then so is the absolute value of j (e)j. Therefore, there exists   such that the proposed
equilibrium exists. This proves rst part.
Suppose F = fvg and note that
E [uB (a; !) js] =
8>><>>:
q (e; s) [1 +   (Pr [ = 1jv = 1])] + (1  q (e; s))   (Pr [ = 1jv = 0]) if a = 1
q (e; s)   (Pr [ = 1jv = 0]) + (1  q (e; s)) [1 +   (Pr [ = 1jv = 1])] if a = 0
thus, as long as 0    (0) <   (1)  1 and regardless of   (Pr [ = 1jv = 1]) and   (Pr [ = 1jv = 0]),
the board will approve the project if and only if q (e; s)  1
2
. This means that the board is
maximizing the probability that a = !. Since the expert board has more information, it follows
that an equilibrium always exists, and in this equilibrium Pr [ = 1jv = 1] > Pr [ = 1jv = 0].
This proves the second part.
Lemma A.12 Consider the model in Section III and suppose the managers power is rede-
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ned as Pr [a = 1j! = 0]. There are circumstances in which managers power increases on the
expense of shareholdersvalue.
Proof. For a given q and ,
Pr [a = 1j! = 0] = 

p  p  q
1  q

 (q; 1;) +

1  p+ p  q
1  q

 (q; 0;)

+ (1  )  1fq 12g
If p  1
2
and  < 1
(3 2) then according to Proposition 4 reputation harms shareholdersvalue.
According to the proof of Proposition 4, without reputation concerns the manager chooses
q = 1
2
and with reputation he chooses q = 1+

2
where  > 0. Using (A13) one can verify
that Pr [a = 1j! = 0] is strictly smaller in the former case. Thus, even under the alternative
denition, managers power can increase on the expense of shareholdersvalue.
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